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Preface
In this thesis we apply an optimal taxation approach to analyze how citizensprivate information
may a¤ect Social Plannergoal of redistribution across individuals. In rst two Chapters, we allow
individuals to emigrate to a laissez-faire country. Chapter 1 assumes the existence of two types of
citizens, who are endowed with a di¤erent labor productivity. We let these two types be low- and
high-skilled, respectively, and assume that emigration is costly. We prove that low-skilled agents
incentive compatibility constraint is never binding at the optimum. Moreover high-skilled citizens
are net taxpayers and, hence, a lump-sum tax is levied by the Social Planner. Relative to the
standard closed-economy model, we also nd that, if the economy stands for two periods, in the
absence of Governments commitment, redistribution is dramatically reduced and that an inducing
rst-period pooling tax scheme is much less likely to be implemented. This implies that a separating
scheme is easier. In Chapter 2 we introduce a third type of citizens, who are characterized by an
intermediate skill level. This allows us to better analyze the distributive e¤ects of taxation. In
particular, we will show that countervailing incentives may occur. Indeed, medium-type citizens
may nd it optimal to mimic high-skilled ones. In a such a context, a separating scheme can
be implemented. However, a distortion at the top arises. As in Chapter 1, Chapter 3 studies
an economy, that is populated by two continua of individuals, who di¤er in labor-productivity.
We allow agents to save and let e¤ort be private information. Therefore, both adverse selection
and moral hazard problems may arise. In particular, we prove that, under adverse selection, it is
optimal for the Social Planner to fully insure high-skilled agents and to over-insure low-skilled ones.
Moreover, no high-type aggregate intertemporal wedge is implemented, while a positive L-aggregate
intertemporal wedge is obtained. Finally, we study the joint e¤ects of dynamic moral hazard and
adverse selection on social welfare. In this case, both types are partially insured. Moreover, both
the H-aggregate intertemporal wedge and the L-aggregate intertemporal wedge are positive.
v
vi CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Dynamic Optimal Taxation under
Migration
1.1 Introduction
Since Mirrlees (1971), who highlighted the trade-o¤ between allocative e¢ ciency and redistribution
under adverse selection, the information asymmetry on individuals has been considered a signicant
constraint on tax policy design. In such a framework, when lump-sum taxation cannot be levied, a
second-best solution arises, where the Social planner o¤ers a menu of fgross income; consumptiong,
making sure that the optimal allocation designed for each i agent is incentive compatible. Two
relevant features of Mirrleesian model are that the economy stands just for one period and that
citizens are forbidden to emigrate to other countries. Mirrlees (1971, p. 176) himself argues that,
"since the threat of migration is a major inuence on the degree of progression in actual tax sys-
tems, at any rate outside the United States", the assumption of impossibility of migration is very
strong and, therefore, should be avoided. It is agreed that, given increasing globalization, high-
skilled potential emigration to tax heaven or less redistributive countries, is a relevant constraint
on governments policy. Wilson (1992) nds that high-types elasticity of potential migration has
a dramatic e¤ect on the role of tax as a redistributional instrument. Simula and Trannoy (2006,
2010) analyze optimal taxation structure in an economy populated by a continuum of individuals,
di¤ering in labor-productivity, when option to migrate to a laissez-faire country is type-dependent.
They nd that high-skilleds migration opportunity may bring to a decrease in the optimal marginal
tax rates, up to be strictly negative. Hence, the optimal average tax rate may decrease.
Within this literature, we want to nd what happens if we move into a two-period setting, letting
agents emigrate to a foreign country in both periods. With specic attention to the second issue, as
underlined by Simula and Trannoy (2006, 2010), high-skilleds migration to tax heavens could be a
heavy constraint on the governments ability at designing a redistributive tax schedule. If the Social
Planner aims to avoid them to leave their country, it has to give them, at the optimum, an utility
level at least identical to the one they would receive abroad, discounted by type-dependent migration
costs. In line with Simula and Trannoy (2006, 2010), we will assume that there exist two countries,
i.e. country "A", endowed with a benevolent Social Planner, and country "B", a pure laissez-faire
economy, and that As citizens can emigrate to B, bearing two di¤erent costs, a migration cost and
1
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a cost of living in a foreign country. The other issue we deal with, is what happens in a repeated
game, instead of a one-shot one. When a government lacks credibility in committing to not use the
information it learns about taxpayersproductivity to raise taxes, the Revelation Principle may no
longer apply and a pooling equilibrium can be optimal from policy-makers point of view. Brett
and Weymark (2008) analyze a two-period closed economy in which individuals of two productivity
types work and consume in both periods. Moreover, they are allowed to save. The government
is assumed to lack of commitment; therefore, they provide an analysis of both a separating and a
pooling tax regimes. Dillén and Lundholm (1996) study a dynamic closed economy, with the well
known ratchet e¤ect, where the Social Planner has as redistributional instruments, linear income
tax. Apps and Rees (2008) show that in a two-period closed economy with Governments lack of
commitment, a rst-period partial pooling may be optimal.
In this Chapter we rst introduce a basic model. In section 2, we analyze a simplied two-type
version of the one-period Mirrlees Model, with a continuum of individuals of each type. In section
3, we analyze the e¤ect of high skilled individualsthreat of migration on the ability of the Social
Planner to design an optimal non-linear tax scheme in the one-period framework. In section 4, we
consider two-period models, both in closed economy and in open economy, showing that, in the
latter case, an inducing rst-period pooling equilibrium tax schedule is less likely to be implemented.
In section 5, we discuss the e¤ects on the optimal tax scheme of time inconsistency of governments
commitment and of possibility of migration.
1.2 Two-Type Models
1.2.1 Optimal Taxation in a closed one-period economy
In order to create a useful benchmark, we start from the very basic one-period model, a simplied
version of the famous Mirrleesmodel.
The economy is populated by two continuum of citizens, each one with a share i > 0; i = L;H;
and
X
i=H;L
i = 1, di¤ering only in their given labor productivity !i, i = H;L, !H > !L;
constant over time.
Its benevolent utilitarian Social Planner aims at redistributing income between agents, in order
to increase equality across population, at the minimum loss of e¢ ciency.
All agents share an identical additive and separable (between consumption good and labor time)
utility function. We assume that both the consumption good and the leisure time are normal goods.
The agents are both consumers and workers; in particular, labor market is perfectly competitive,
having li as the only production input, with constant return to scale. So, agent is gross income yi
(in terms of consumption good) is dened as:
yi = !ili; i = H;L: (1.1)
Each agent knows his own ability, whereas such an information is unavailable to the Social
Planner, which only knows the distribution of the ability across the whole population. Agent is
utility function is given by:
Ui = u(xi)  v(li); 8i = H;L; (1.2)
where xi = yi   Ti  0 represents i0s consumption as the di¤erence between is gross income and
total tax paid in terms of consumption good (where Ti can be positive or negative), with u (x) as an
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increasing and strictly concave function in xi and v (l) as an increasing and strictly convex function
in li;both twice di¤erentiable, 8i; this means that Ui, i = H;L, is strictly concave.
1.2.2 First-Best in a closed one-period economy
In a symmetric-information setting, the government knows the ability of each individual. Assuming
that it can use a lump-sum1 tool, the policy maker nds optimal to redistribute resources according
to agentstype. Therefore, its policy does not depend on consumption and labor supply and that it
can tax and subsidy its citizens through a lump sum redistribution, function only of the consumers
type. By assumption, the government
max
(xL;lL;xH ;lH)
Wf:b:closed (UH ;UL) =
X
i=H;L
i [u(xi)  v(li)] (1.3)
s.t. the budget balance constraint (BC)X
i=H;L
i (!ili;A   xi;A)  0; () (1.4)
Proposition 1.2.1 An allocation (xL; l

L; x

H ; l

H) solving (1:3) s.t. (1:4) satises
u0
 
xH;A

= u0
 
xL;A

; (1.5)
v0
 
lH;A

!H
=
v0
 
lL;A

!L
; (1.6)
where the Lagrangian multiplier of (1:4),  > 0:
from proposition (1:2:1), given (1:5) ; we can immediately obtain
xH;A = x

L;A (1.7)
Moreover, by (1:6) and !h > !l > 0, we can see that:
v0
 
lH;A

> v0
 
lL;A

: (1.8)
Given the convexity of v (), we therefore obtain
lH;A > l

L;A (1.9)
Substituting (1:7) and (1:9) into (1:2) we obtain
UH = u(x

H)  v(lH) < u(xL)  v(lL) = UL: (1.10)
1A lump sum tax on high productivity agents (and a subsidy on low type consumers) does not distort the optimal
choice of consumers/workers, because it only generates an income e¤ect. Instead, a marginal tax rate (or subsidy) also
causes a substitution e¤ect between leisure time and consumption, thereby a¤ecting the optimal (xi; vi) allocation,
8i = H;L:
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Given these results, we see that, at the social optimum, the two types of agents consume identically.
However, high-skilled agents work more. Due to this fact, the utility of a low skilled agent is higher
than the utility of a high skilled one. We can, therefore, say that the government taxes high-skilled
workers to subsidize the low-skilled ones, under (1:4) :
Of course, this socially optimal allocation is not appreciated by high types, who have an incentive
to mimic the behavior of low type individuals.
1.2.3 Second-Best in a closed one-period economy
Let us now assume that personal ability is private information, i.e., each agent knows her produc-
tivity type, whereas the tax authority does not. It just knows the overall distribution of the ability
across his citizens.
In particular, the government is unable to observe each individuals skill level !i and units of
labor supply li, but it can observe both her levels of consumption xi and gross labor income yi. By
assumption, it also knows the functional form of Ui, i = L;H. In order to achieve its target, the
Social Planner can levy both a lump sum tax and a marginal tax rate on visible gross income yi.
From the point of view of the Social Planner, i-agents utility function becomes
u(xi)  v

yi
!i

 u(xi)  v(li); (1.11)
where yi!i = li, and
v0

yi
!i

!i
> 0;
v
00 yi
!i

!i
> 0: Therefore, we obtain
MRSyi;xi =
v0 (li)
u0(xi)
=
v0( yi!i )
!iu0(xi)
: (1.12)
From (1:12) ; keeping constant yi and xi levels, if we increase the productivity level !i, we
see that the MRS
yi;xi
decreases. Producing an additional unit of output is less labor demanding.
This means that, in laissez faire, the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition holds: high-skilled
individuals produce and consume more, than lower type ones.
Since individual productivity is not known to the Social Planner, it must o¤er an incentive
compatible tax scheme2 , where each i type citizen will weakly prefer, at the optimum, the allocation
(xi ; y

i ) designed for her to the one designed for a j   type individual. In particular, if (xH ; yH) is
chosen by high skilled citizens, they will reveal their characteristics and the Social Planner will be
able to redistribute from them to the low-skilled individuals.
Given asymmetric information, the social Planner
max
(xL;xH ;yL;yH)
Ws:b:closed (UH ;UL) =
X
i=H;L
i

u(xi)  v

yi
!i

(1.13)
s.t. X
i=H;L
i (yi   xi)  0; () (1.14)
2Actually, since there are only two types of agents, by the revelation principle it will be optimal for the tax author-
ity to set just two optimal allocations
 
xL; y

L

and
 
xH ; y

H

, since each allocation has to be incentive compatible
for the agent for whom it has been designed.
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In addition, the
 
xsbH ; y
sb
H

has to be incentive compatible for high skilled citizens (ICH )
u(xH)  v

yH
!H

 u(xL)  v

yL
!H

; () (1.15)
while
 
xsbL ; y
sb
L

has to be incentive compatible for low-skilled agents (ICL)
u(xL)  v

yL
!L

 u(xH)  v

yH
!L

: (1.16)
We guess that (1:16) is strictly satised at the constrained optimum, since Social Planners
problem comes from !H ability of claiming to be low-skilled, in order to limit redistribution at her
expenses. Therefore, we can neglect this latter constraint into the maximization process and check
ex-post if
 
xsbL ; y
sb
L

satises it.
Proposition 1.2.2 At the optimal allocation
 
xsbH ; y
sb
H ; x
sb
L ; y
sb
L

,  > 0;  > 0 and (1:16) is
strictly satised. Moreover, the MRS are:
MRSyH;A;xH;A =
v0

ysbH;A
!i

!Hu0

xsbH;A
 = 1 (1.17)
and
MRSyL;xL =
v0

ysbL
!L

!Lu0
 
xsbL
 = 1  
L   
24 v0

ysbL
!L

!Lu0
 
xsbL
   v0

ysbL
!H

!Hu0
 
xsbL

35 < 1 (1.18)
where 24 v0

ysbL
!L

!Lu0
 
xsbL
   v0

ysbL
!H

!Hu0
 
xsbL

35 > 0
measures the di¤erence between the slopes of L-type and H-type agentsat the optimal low skilled
individualsallocation
 
xsbL ; y
sb
L

.
It shows the trade o¤ between the cost derived from the underproduction of low-type agents
and the gain of increasing the redistribution from high skilled people to low skilled ones: the higher
is the di¤erence (!H   !L), the higher is the advantage for H-type citizens to mimic L-type ones
(i.e. (1:15) is relatively tighter), the higher is the downward distortion in the constrained optimal
L-type allocation
 
xsbL ; y
sb
L

.
Condition (1:17) shows that there is no distortion at the top: the decision of H-individuals is
not distorted at the margin, just as in the rst best case. It means that the tax authority will levy
only a lump sum tax on them and, so, that the marginal tax rate on labor income is zero3 .
Condition (1:18) reveals us that there is a distortion at the bottom: L-individuals underproduce,
comparing to the rst best case. From (1:18) we can see that
@
8<:1  L 
24 v0 ysbL!L 
!Lu0(xsbL )
 
v0

ysbL
!H

!Hu0(xsbL )
359=;
@L
< 0:
3The implicit marginal tax rate on is gross labor income is equal to (1 MRSyi;xi ) :
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The negative sign of this derivative means that the higher the fraction of low-skilled population,
the lower will be the optimal distortion in L-types optimal choice. This is due to the fact that
the tax authority has a weaker incentive to create separation between the two types of individual.
Low-skilled workers face a positive marginal tax rate
L =

L   
24 v0

ysbL
!L

!Lu0
 
xsbL
   v0

ysbL
!H

!Hu0
 
xsbL

35
on their gross income, receiving a lump-sum subsidy, that overcompensates them for L. Moreover,
we have that
u0
 
xsbH

u0
 
xsbL
 =

1  1 H


1 + H
 < 1:
By concavity of u (x) we can derive that
xsbH > x
sb
L (1.19)
Since constraint (1:15) is binding at the optimum, inequality (1:19) implies that
0 < u
 
xsbH
  u  xsbL  = vysbH!H

  v

ysbL
!H

:
According to this result, in a second-best scenario, high-skilled individuals still work more than
low skilled ones. Since consumption and leisure time are normal goods, however, at the optimum
high-type workers both consume more and work less, than in the rst-best case.
1.3 Optimal taxation problem in an open one-period econ-
omy
So far, we have assumed that the economy (from now on, country A) was closed to citizensmi-
gration. This meant that the government could levy its optimal tax schedule to its citizens, taking
into account only the social budget constraint, BC, and H-types incentive compatibility constraint,
ICH. Let us next assume that there is another country, denoted as B: By assumption, country B
is a simple laissez-faire economy, without taxation on gross labor income.
At the very beginning, the whole population bears in A. Then, after Government presents
country As tax scheme, each agent can move from one country to the other.
Therefore, we need to slightly modify the previous notation; is utilities, when living in country
A and in country B; become
Ui;A = u(xi;A)  v(li;A);
and
Ui;B = u(xi;B)  v(li;B);
respectively.
Therefore, country As citizens are free to emigrate to B. There are assumed to exist two
di¤erent costs related to the migration:
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Assumption 1.3.1 ci;B > 0, 8i = H;L, the cost of moving from one country to the other one.
This cost is identical going from A to B and vice versa.
Assumption 1.3.2 ki;B > 0, 8i = H;L; the cost of living "abroad". This cost is borne by i-
individual in each period spent in country B.
We let both ci;B and ki;B be common knowledge. It is worth noting that, since country B is
a laissez-faire economy, the utility of i when living in country B, i.e. Ui;B (including the costs of
moving and living abroad, respectively ci;B and ki;B), is increasing in !i: In particular, assumed
that there only two types of As citizens, i.e. !H and !L, low-skilled individuals would not have any
incentive to emigrate from country A, in which they would gain from the redistributive tax system,
to a laissez-faire country B, facing also two di¤erent costs, ci;B and ki;B : Di¤erently, we need to
assume that high skilled agentsutility level in (if country A was a closed economy) is lower than
the one they would receive in the laissez-faire country B, discounted by the costs, otherwise there
is no reason to consider the issue of migration.
Given this framework, we get that only H-workers can credibly threat to emigrate from A to
B (setting up a ratio to insert a high-skilled agentsparticipation constraint, PCH, into the social
planners maximization problem).
1.3.1 The First-Best
Let us start a rst-best setting with symmetric information. Since high-skilled workers can credibly
move to B, if taxes are too high, country As government has to maximize the modied social
welfare function
Wf:b:open
(xL;A;lL;A;xH;A;lH;A)
(UH;A; UL;A) =
X
i=H;L
i [u(xi;A)  v(li;A)] (1.20)
s.t. both the BC X
i=H;L
i (!ili;A   xi;A)  0 () ; (1.21)
and the following PCH
u (xH;A)  v (lH;A)  bUH;B () ; (1.22)
where bUH;B is the maximum utility level that a high-skilled worker would obtain by moving to
country B and living abroad for one period4 . We guess that low-type agentsparticipation constraint
will not bind at the optimum; therefore we can neglect it and check ex-post that it is slack at the
optimal allocation.
4 bUH;B = U bxH;B ;blH;B is the result of the following high-skilled workers maximization problem:
max UH;B = u
 
xH;B
  v  lH;B
s.t.
xH;B  !H lH;B  
 
cH;B + kH;B

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Proposition 1.3.1 At the optimal allocation
 
xL;A; l

L;A; x

H;A; l

H;A

,  > 0 and  > 0. Moreover,
the neglected L-type participation constraint is slack and the equalities
1 +

H

u0
 
xH;A

= u0
 
xL;A

(1.23)
and 
1 + H

v0
 
lH;A

!H
=
v0
 
lL;A

!L
(1.24)
hold.
Given the concavity of u (xi;A) and the convexity of v (li;A) ;the normality of x and leisure time
and !H > !L > 0; from (1:23), (1:24) and (1:6) we can show that
xH;A > x

L;A
and 
xH;A > x

H;cl:ec:
lH;A < l

H;cl:ec:
xL;A < x

L;cl:ec:
lL;A > l

L;cl:ec:
Even if PCH reduce the extent of redistribution from the high-skilled fraction to the low one,
because of the existence of cH;B and kH;B ; it is still feasible to levy positive lump-sum taxes on
H-individuals, until the PCH becomes binding, subsidizing with this tax revenue L-consumers5 . As
in rst-best closed economy, no distorting marginal tax rate  on labor income is levied on As
citizens.
Moreover, since PCH is binding at the optimum, high-productivity types are indi¤erent between
staying in A or moving to B; so, they will remain in their own country, A. In particular, since at
the solution of the problem UH;A = bUH;B and MRSlH;A;xH;A =MRSlH;B ;xH;B , we obtain
T H;A = cH;B + kH;B
and
lH;A = l

H;B
xH;A = !H l

H;A   T H;A = !H lH;B   (cH;B + kH;B)
It is worth noting that the omitted PCL is strictly satised at the optimum, because in country
A, low-skilled people receive a lump sum subsidy. Therefore, they consume more than they produce.
If they emigrated to B, they would consume less than they produce, due to the costs of emigrating
and living abroad.
5These tax schedules, together with the fact that UL;A indi¤erence curve is always steeper than U

H;A. This
implies that lH;A > l

L;A.
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1.3.2 The Second-Best
Let us next focus on a second-best case, where productivity is private information.
Accordingly, the Social Welfare Function in (1:13) ; the budget constraint in (1:14) ; the ICH
in(1:15) ; and the PCH6 in (1:22) ; must be modied in order to account for such an information
asymmetry. Therefore, the Social Planner
max
(xL;A;yL;A;xH;A;yH;A)
Ws:b:open (UH;A;UL;A) =
X
i=H;L
i

u(xi;A)  v

yi;A
!i

(1.25)
s.t. X
i=H;L
i (yi;A   xi;A)  0; () (1.26)
u(xH;A)  v

yH;A
!H

 u(xL;A)  v

yL;A
!H

; () (1.27)
u (xH;A)  v

yH;A
!H

 bUH;B , () (1.28)
It is worth noting that the value of bUH;B is crucial to understand how constraints (1:27) and
(1:28) interact. There are three possible cases.
Case 1.3.1 If bUH;B is lower than UsbH , the utility high-type citizens can get by choosing the former
contract
 
xsbH ; y
sb
H

, the problem the Social Planner faces corresponds to the Mirrlees one, i.e.
the "Second-Best Optimal Taxation Problem in a closed one-period economy". Therefore, the only
binding at the optimum constraints in the social welfare maximization problem are (1:26) and (1:27) :
Case 1.3.2 If bUH;B coincides with UsbH ; i.e., the two "outside options" are identical from the point
of view of country As Government, it is optimal to implement an optimal tax scheme coincident with
the one in the standard "Second-Best Optimal Taxation Problem in a closed one-period economy",
by levying a (distortionary) positive marginal tax rate on low-skilled agents, and a zero marginal
tax rate on high-skilled ones.
Case 1.3.3 If, nally, bUH;B is strictly higher than UsbH , there are two possible situations the Social
Planner can face:
1. if bUH;B is su¢ ciently high (i.e., cH;B + kH;B low enough), only (1:28) binds at the optimum
and, therefore, H-agents have non incentive on mimicking L-agents (i.e., (1:27) is slack at
the optimal allocation). Therefore, that no reason to cause a distortion at the bottom, i.e.,
sb openL = 0. This means that, from Social Planners point of view, the "Second-Best Opti-
mal Taxation Problem in an open one-period economy" coincides with a "First-Best Optimal
Taxation Problem in an open one-period economy". This case is likely to be faced whenever
the di¤erence in labor productivity (!H   !L) is considerable, or when H-types migration
opportunity is a relevant option.
6The RHS of new PCH (i.e. bUH;B), coincides with the one in (1:22), because As tax authority knows that only
L-individuals could have the incentive to move to country B; therefore he can anticipate the optimal utility level bUH;B
they can achieve by moving abroad.
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2. Otherwise, both (1:28) and (1:27) may be binding at the optimum. In this case, the Closed
Second-Best solution is no longer valid. Since H-skilled agents must receive at least bUH;B>UsbH ,
they will pay a lower lump-sum tax. Keeping L constant and reducing subsidy on low-skilled
agents (since H-type ones pay less lump-sum taxes), given assumptions on utility function, L-
citizens would produce more and consume less, than in second-best closed setting. Therefore,
(1:27) becomes slack. Then, the Social Planner can reduce L-type citizensoptimal marginal
tax rate L; since both leisure time and consumption good are normal and the former is now
relatively more expensive, L-agents choose to optimally produce and consume more. If this
new L-types optimal allocation, i.e.,

xsb openL ; y
sb open
L

is such that xsb openL > x
sb
L (cer-
tainly, ysb openL > y
sb
L ), it may be the case that both (1:27) and (1:28) are simultaneously
binding. Therefore, L is reduced, but not set to zero. In particular, we have
0 < sb openL =

L   
264 v0

ysb openL
!L

!Lu0

xsb openL
   v0

ysb openL
!H

!Hu0

xsb openL

375
< L =

L   
24 v0

ysbL
!L

!Lu0
 
xsbL
   v0

ysbL
!H

!Hu0
 
xsbL

35 :
Clearly, in both cases (1) and (2), high-typesoptimal utility level increases (from UsbH to bUH;B)
and, therefore, low-typesone decreases (i.e. less than UsbL ), otherwise the allocation obtained in
the "Second-Best Optimal Taxation Problem in a closed one-period economy" would not be optimal
(i.e., a Pareto improvement would be feasible). However, case (1) is more plausible, and therefore,
of much interest. Due to market openess, the higher high-skilled agentsmigration opportunity, the
higher the likelihood of the case to be faced and, therefore, the lower the redistribution of resources
to low-skilled agents.
The foregoing reasonings follow also from the omission of both PCL and ICL. Is it reasonable?
Let us begin with PCL. If (1:27) is binding at the optimum, we are in a standard Mirrlees
framework. As we said, the optimal allocation to low-skilled agents is such that they face a L > 0
on their gross labor income and receive a lump-sum transfer that more than repays for the implicit
positive marginal tax rate on ysbL :
On the other hand, if bUH;B  UsbH , PCH is binding; at the optimum, high-type fraction of
As population is indi¤erent to emigrate or to stay in its country and choosing the allocation
designed for it. In the latter case, it will transfer a positive lump-sum amount to the low-type one
( bTH;A = cH;B + kH;B). Therefore,L-individuals prefer to stay in A.
In both cases, low-type individuals enjoy a strictly higher utility, compared to what they could
obtain moving abroad.
ICL is not binding at the optimum. Also, notice that, if case 1 (or 3) is the relevant one, at
the optimum
u(xsbH )  v

ysbH
!H

= u(xsbL )  v

ysbL
!H

or
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u(xsbH )  u(xsbL ) = v

ysbH
!H

  v

ysbL
!H

: (1.29)
Notice that the ICL is not binding at the optimum if
u(xsbH )  u(xsbL ) < v

ysbH
!L

  v

ysbL
!L

: (1.30)
Using (1:29) and rearranging, gives
v

ysbH
!L

  v

ysbH
!H

> v

ysbL
!L

  v

ysbL
!H

: (1.31)
Since v () is increasing and convex in yi, the inequality (1:31) holds and the ICL is never binding.
Moreover, in case 2, we must have that ICH is slack at the optimum. Indeed, the existence of
cH;B and kH;B ; assures that bTH;A > 0: Therefore, the government is not induced to extract resources
from the low-type agents to redistribute it to high-skilled ones. Hence, the ICL is unbinding at the
optimum.
Therefore, we can conclude that the omitted ICL and PCL are never binding at the optimum.
Given these results, the Social Planners problem is as follows:
Lemma 1.3.1 The social planner chooses the optimal allocation
 
xL;A; y

L;A; x

H;A; y

H;A

in order
to maximize (1:25) subject to (1:26) and (1:27), or (1:28), or both.
1.4 Dynamic Optimal Taxation
The Mirrlees model shows that, in a static contest, the best result achievable by a benevolent
government (who cares about utility redistribution to worse-o¤ individuals, minimizing the loss
of e¢ ciency) is to o¤er each i agent an incentive compatible allocation (xi; yi). The Revelation
Principle ensures that she picks only the allocation designed for her, thereby revealing her own
type to the government. The result of this social welfare constrained maximization problem is an
optimal non linear taxation, i.e. a combination of lump-sum taxes and subsidies and distorting
marginal tax rates on gross labor income.
In a dynamic setting, the Revelation Principle may no longer apply, since it could be too
expensive for the tax authority to design an inducing separation tax schedule. Actually, high-skilled
individuals may fear that the Social Planner could use in future the information obtained about
their type, in order to achieve a rst-best solution, extracting more taxes from them. Therefore, an
incentive compatible allocation on high-types could result to be so costly, to induce the government
to nd optimal a non-separating tax schedule.
The ratchet e¤ect (i.e., the possibility that the government uses the previously gained informa-
tion in order to increase future redistribution) would not be a dramatic issue, if the Social Planner
can commit not to use these additional information on citizens type in subsequent periods. If
commitment is possible, the dynamic adverse selection game is just a repeated one-shot game and
its optimal solution is to repeat each period the Mirrlees optimal tax schedule in a one-period
economy.
Unfortunately, this kind of commitment is hard to be achieved and a time inconsistency problem
is likely to arise.
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In order to analyze a two-period model, we need to further modify is utility function:
Ui = u(x
1
i )  v(
y1i
!i
) + [u(x2i )  v(
y2i
!i
)];8i = H;L; t = f1; 2g ; 0 <   1: (1.32)
In both periods all the individuals work and consume, but neither they, nor the government
arent allowed to save, lend and borrow money.
1.4.1 The Optimal tax problem in a closed economy without commit-
ment
If the Social Planner, while designing the optimal second-period tax schedule, is unable to commit
to not use in period 2 the information obtained in period 1, a rst-period inducing types separation
tax policy may no longer be optimal. The Social Planners has two alternatives:
1. to design a rst-period tax schedule inducing pooling.
The governments gain while adopting this strategy is that it is likely to be less costly than
a tax policy encouraging high-skilled individuals to reveal their type. On the other hand, its
loss is related to the fact that he cannot obtain any information about citizens type and,
therefore, in period two it will face the classic "Second-best optimal taxation problem in a
one-period closed economy".
2. To design a rst-period tax schedule inducing separation.
The trade o¤ the Social Planner has to consider, is between the gain in second period, since
it will face a "First-best optimal taxation problem in a one-period closed economy", and the
rst-period cost to be borne to induce high-skilled workers to reveal their own type7 .
Optimal Taxation Problem in a closed two-period economy when pooling arises in the
rst period
1. We start solving the second-period social welfare maximization problem, assuming that in
period 1 the Social Planner designs a tax schedule inducing the whole population to choose
the same allocation
 
x1; y1

; i.e. a pooling equilibrium. Therefore, it does not arise any
information about its citizenstypes and cannot update its belief about any individual. In this
case, the policy-makers problem is the one solved in (1:2:3) ; namely, a "Second-best optimal
taxation problem in a one-period closed economy".
At the beginning of time 1, while designing the optimal rst-period pooling allocation, i.e. 
x1; y1

, the Social Planner already anticipates the level of the maximized second period
social welfare function. Nevertheless, the latter choice (period 2) only depends on second-
period variables x2i ; y
2
i ; i = H;L: Moreover, since the tax authority does not aim to separate
types, BC is the only binding at the optimum constraint.
Therefore, the Social Planner
7Actually, it is also possible to adopt a mixed strategy, inducing only a portion of !H As citizens to reveal their
type and letting the remaining high-skilled agents to pool with all the low types, i.e a partial pooling.
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max
(x1;y1)
W 1closed pool =
X
i=H;L
i

u(x1)  v

y1
!i

+W 2closed pool (1.33)
s.t.  
y1   x1  0; (1) (1.34)
Proposition 1.4.1 At the optimal solution, i.e.,
 
x1; y1

, 1 > 0: Moreover,
H
v0

y1
!H

!Hu0 (x1)
+ (1  H)
v0

y1
!L

!Lu0 (x1)
= 1: (1.35)
By single-crossing condition, at the
 
x1; y1

allocation, low-type individualsindi¤erence curve is
steeper than higher skilled agentsone. Therefore, we can say that
MRSyL;xL > 1 > MRSyH ;xH (1.36)
Since the pooling equilibrium is due to the behavior of the H-citizens who mimic L-ones, the
Governments optimal tax schedule is based on these latter.
Hence, we obtain 1 = 1L = (1 MRSyL;xL) < 0 (i.e., low-skilled agents are subsidized at
the margin). Because of (1:34), the tax authority must also levy a lump-sum tax on tax payers.
Conversely, since MRSyH ;xH < 1, high-types face (an implicit) positive marginal tax rate on their
gross labor income.
Finally, in order to prevent high-skilled people from working and thus earning more (they could
be better o¤ by doing so), the Social Planner must set 1
0
= 100%; 8y0 > y1:
Optimal Taxation Problem in a closed two-period economy when separation of types
arises in the rst period
Let us now focus on the second pure strategy. In this case, the Social Planner can design an optimal
two-period tax schedule inducing separation of types in period 1.
In period 2, assuming that in period 1 high-skilled individuals revealed themselves, by choosing
the optimal incentive compatible rst-period allocation
 
x1H ; y
1
H

designed for them, the government
faces a "First-best optimal taxation problem in a closed economy" shown in (??) .
This means that there are only non-distortionary lump-sum taxes on high-skilled individuals
and lump-sum subsidies to the low-skilled ones, aimed at equalizing all citizensconsumption, i.e.
x2H = x
2
L .
Moreover, at the optimum, H-agents will receive a lower net utility, than in the pooling case of
period 1: This loss is equal to

 = u(x2L )  v

y2L
!H

 

u(x2H )  v

y2H
!H

; (1.37)
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where
h
u(x2L )  v

y2L
!H
i
corresponds to the utility high-skilled agents receive at the constrained
optimum, in "Second-best optimal taxation problem in a one-period closed economy" setting andh
u(x2H )  v

y2H
!H
i
is what they gain at the optimal allocation in "First-best optimal taxation prob-
lem in a closed economy" one. In period 1 high-skilled individuals expect that, by revealing their
type, they lose 
 in period 2. Therefore, when the Social Planner designs a rst-period inducing
separation optimal tax scheme, it must account for high-skilled workers expectations. This implies
that the ICH must be such that
u(x1H)  v

y1H
!H

+ 

u(x2H )  v

y2H
!H

(1.38)
 u(x1L)  v

y1L
!H

+ 

u(x2L )  v

y2L
!H

or, rearranging (1:38),
u(x1H)  v

y1H
!H

 u(x1L)  v

y1L
!H

+ 
; (1) (1.39)
In period 1; the government
max
(x1L;y1L;x1H ;y1H)
W 1closed sep =
X
i=H;L
i

u(x1i )  v

y1i
!i

+W 2closed sep (1.40)
s.t. the BC X
i=H;L
i
 
y1i   x1i
  0; (1) (1.41)
and (1:39) :
Proposition 1.4.2 At the optimal allocation
 
x1L ; y
1
L ; x
1
H ; y
1
H

, both 1 and 1 are strictly posi-
tive. SinceW 2sep and 

u(x2L )  hH
 
y2L
  u(x2H )  hH  y2H  are not a¤ected by variables  x1L; y1L; x1H ; y1H,
the optimal tax scheme highlights qualitatively identical properties of the standard "Second-Best Op-
timal Taxation Problem in a closed one-period economy": no distortion at the top and distortion
at the bottom. However, at the optimum, the allocation chosen by high skilled individuals, i.e., 
x1H ; y
1
H

, will be strictly better than the one they would obtain in the standard Mirrleesian one-
shot game, i.e.
 
xsbH ; y
sb
H

: The gain is just equal to 
.
1.4.2 Optimal taxation problem in an open economy without commit-
ment
Let us next assume that country As citizens can move across countries. Relative to a closed
two-period economy, H-agents have three additional options:
1. to emigrate in period 1 to country B and to stay there in both periods. Thus, they reach the
following utility level: bU1H;B +  eU2H;B (1.42)
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where bU1H;B is time invariant. This is due to the fact that bU1H;B  bU2H;B ; since parameters cH;B
and kH;B are reasonably constant across periods and !H is exogenously given, by denition)
and eU2H;B is the maximum utility level that high-skilled workers would obtain by living in
country B in period 2, given that they emigrated to the laissez-faire country in period 18 (i.e.,
in period 2 they only pay the lump-sum cost kH;B).
2. To emigrate in period 2 to country B and to come back in the second one. Note that by moving
to country B, they implicitly reveal their own high-type to the Social Planner, because the
low-skilled agents have no incentive to emigrate. Therefore, in period 2 they would have to
face a "First Best closed economy allocation", with the additional charge of cH;B :So, it is
straightforward that this option is never optimal.
3. To stay in country A in period 1 and to move abroad in the second one.
Optimal taxation problem in an open two-period economy, when the Social Planner
designs an inducing rst-period separation tax schedule.
If the Government chooses a rst-period tax schedule aimed at inducing separation, it is aware that
the more stringent between the following two high-type constraints
(x1H;A)  v
 
y1H;A
!H
!
+  bU2H;B (1.43)
 u(x1L;A)  v
 
y1L;A
!H
!
+ max
("
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
; bU2H;B
)
and
(x1H;A)  v
 
y1H;A
!H
!
+  bU2H;B  bU1H;B +  eU2H;B (1.44)
will hold. Moreover,
h
u(x2L;A)  v

y2L;A
!H
i
(corresponding to the utility high-skilled workers reach at
8Notice that eU2H;B = U ex2H;B ;el2H;B is the optimal solution of the following problem:
max
l2
H;B
U2H;B = u

x2H;B

  v

l2H;B

s.t.
x2H;B  !H l2H;B   kH;B
Again, since both xti and leisure time are normal goods, and given the absence of cH;B; we can derive that( ex2H;B > bx2H;Bel2H;B < bl2H;B
and, consequently,
eU2H;B > bU2H;B
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the optimum in "Second-best one period closed economy" case) cannot be less than
h
u(x1L;A)  v

y1L;A
!H
i
at the constrained optimal
 
x1sbL;A ; y
1sb
L;A

, and eU2H;B > bU2H;B :
If
max
("
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
; bU2H;B
)
= bU2H;B = bU1H;B ;
then bU1H;B >
"
u(x1L;A)  v
 
y1L;A
!H
!#
and, therefore, (1:44) is the binding constraint9 . In this case, high-skilled agentsmigration is the
only credible threat. This means that, in period 2; the government faces a "First-Best Optimal
Taxation Problem in an open one-period economy".
In period 1; Social Planners problem is as follows:
max
xH;A;yH;A;xL;A;yL;A
W 1open sep =
X
i=H;L
i
"
u(x1i;A)  v
 
y1i;A
!i
!#
+W 2f:b:open (1.45)
s.t.
(1:41)
and
(1:44) :
Notice that (1:45) is similar to the problem faced by the tax authority in period 2, a part from
the fact that redistribution is further lower (but still positive), given the more stringent PCH it
has to take into account.
If
max
("
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
; bU2H;B
)
= bU2H;B = bU1H;B ;
a rst-period pooling equilibrium cannot be achieved, since to be chosen by high-skilled individu-
als, it would require in period 1 (the second one is identical in both cases) an optimal allocation 
x1A ; y
1
A

; that gives them an even higher utility, compared to the one they obtain by threatening
emigration to country B. So, there would be no trade o¤: a more costly (in terms of redistribu-
tion) rst-period tax scheme (when compared to the separating solution), would be implemented.
However, in period 2 there would be no gain in social welfare.
If, conversely, (1:43) is binding at the optimum,"
u(x1H;A)  v
 
y1H;A
!H
!#
=
"
u(x1L;A)  v
 
y1L;A
!H
!#
+ 
("
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
  bU2H;B
)
:
Since in t = 1; the term 
nh
u(x2L;A)  v

y2L;A
!H
i
  bU2H;Bo is xed and is strictly lower than 
,
di¤erently from the closed-economy case, the Social Planner can levy a higher lump-sum tax on
H-individuals.
9This argument also holds if

u(x2L;A)  v

y2L;A
!H

= bU2H;B .
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A necessary, but not su¢ cient, condition10 for (1:43) to be the relevant H-type constraint in the
Social Welfare maximization problem is that"
u(x1L;A)  v
 
y1L;A
!H
!#
> bU1H;B :
and, therefore,
max
("
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
; bU2H;B
)
=
"
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
:
In this case, emigration in period 1 is not a real threat: migration costs are so high, that the Social
Planner is not worried about the possibility that H-citizens immediately move abroad. The rst-
period maximization problem is similar to the "First-period Optimal Taxation Problem inducing
separation of types in a closed economy". The only di¤erence is that now separation is less costly: in
fact, high-skilled agents are aware that, in period 2; they will receive exactly bU2H;B (it corresponds to
the "First-Best Optimal Taxation Problem in an open one-period economy"), that is assumed to be
strictly higher than the utility they would achieve in the "First-best closed economy" environment.
Therefore, they are no longer so worried about revealing their own productivity level. Since (1:43)
ensures a rst-period separating equilibrium, in period 2; high-skilled migration is a credible threat.
Consequently, in period 2 the Social Planner will face a "First-Best Optimal Taxation Problem in
an open one period economy".
Optimal tax problem in an open two-period economy, when the Social Planner designs
an inducing rst-period pooling tax schedule.
It is worth pointing out that migration reduces the social value of productivity information, since
the rst-best allocation is constrained by high-type outside opportunity. In period 1, a separation
tax scheme is less costly, since the second-period social gain is lower. Therefore, a "First period
Optimal Taxation Problem with pooling" is unlikely to be faced. A necessary condition for such a
tax schedule to be implemented is that
max
("
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
; bU2H;B
)
=
"
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
:
The Social planner is aware that, before its decision (policy intervention), H-type agents can
make two alternative decisions:
U1;2H = (x
1
A)  v

y1A
!H

+ max
("
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#
; bU2H;B
)
(1.46)
or
U1;2H =
bU1H;B +  eU2H;B (1.47)
10Conversely, a su¢ cient condition for it is that"
u(x1L;A)  v
 
y1L;A
!H
!#
> eU2H;B :
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If
h
u(x2L;A)  v

y2L;A
!H
i
 bU2H;B  bU1H;B < eU2H;B ; in order to have pooling, we should have that
(x1A)  v

y1A
!H

 bU1H;B +  eU2H;B   bU2H;B : (1.48)
As pointed out, in period 1, a pooling equilibrium strategy is suboptimal, compared to the
inducing-separation one. In both strategies, the Social Planner knows that in the second period
has to give high-skilled individuals at least bU2H;B , in order to prevent their migration. Moreover, 
x1A ; y
1
A

(rst-period pooling optimal allocation) must give them the same utility of the inducing
separation optimal H-bundle (i.e.

x1sep:H;A ; y
1sep:
H;A

), since the R.H.S. of (1:44) corresponds to the
one in (1:48) : Since
 
x1A ; y
1
A
 6= x1sep:H;A ; y1sep:H;A  ; and given that latter bundle ensures revelation
of types,

x1sep:H;A ; y
1sep:
H;A

is preferable from the social point of view.
Assume now
h
u(x2L;A)  v

y2L;A
!H
i
> bU2H;B  bU1H;B < eU2H;B : Therefore, in period 2, if high-
productive citizens are still in country A, the Social Planner will face a "Second-Best Optimal
Taxation Problem in a open (or, in this case equivalently, closed) one period economy", where the
only relevant constraints are (1:26) and (1:27) :
In period 1, in order to implement an inducing pooling tax schedule that also prevents H-type
agentsmigration, the government must satises the following constraint:
(x1A)  v

y1A
!H

 bU1H;B + 
(eU2H;B  
"
u(x2L;A)  v
 
y2L;A
!H
!#)
: (1.49)
Whenever
h
u(x2L;A)  v

y2L;A
!H
i
> bU2H;B , there is a rationale for a pooling strategy. Indeed, a
pooling strategy gives high-type workers a higher utility in period 2 (compared to the one, bU2H;B ;
given through a rst-period separating strategy), while preventing emigration in period 1 is less
costly from the social welfare point of view. The lower
neU2H;B   hu(x2L;A)  v y2L;A!H io (i.e. high-
type agents have higher migration costs), the easier will be such a tax scheme.
1.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter we have shown that the threat of migration a¤ects negatively redistribution across
individuals in Mirrleesian framework. When there exist only two types of agents (i.e., high-type
and low-type ones), the presence of strictly positive migration costs for high-skilled workers ensures
a positive redistribution from them to the less productive ones. In such a model, countervailing
incentives are not an issue, neither in one-period models, nor in two-period ones. In particular, when
the economy stands for only one period, at least one, between high-types incentive constraint and
high-types participation constraint, is binding at the optimum (besides social budget constraint,
being always binding at the optimum). Whenever high-types incentive constraint is binding at the
optimum (both in the case that PCH is slack at the optimum and in the case that PCH is binding,
too) high-skilled workerslabor supply is not distorted at the margin, while there is a downward
marginal distortion for low-skilled ones. When only high-types participation constraint is binding
at the optimum, the most e¢ cient tax schedule is obtained through lump-sum tax to high-skilled
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agents and lump-sum subsidy to low-skilled ones: no marginal tax rate is levied on citizens. On the
other hand, when the economy lives for two periods and the Social Planner is unable to commit
itself to not use in period 2 the information gained during period 1, in order to reach the best social
outcome, it is common knowledge that the revelation principle may not apply. In the two-period
setting, highly productive workers can choose some possible strategies due to their ability to move
abroad. For instance, by moving abroad in the rst period and staying in country B in the second
one, they get more than twice the utility they obtain by migrating (since during the second period
abroad they dont have to pay cH;B ; the cost of moving from country A to laissez-faire country B).
However the existence of migration costs cH;B and kH;B ensures that high-type citizens are, at the
optimal solution, net tax payers. Hence, freedom to migrate in period 2 makes rst-period pooling
strategy less likely to be implemented, since redistribution in period 2 is limited by second-period
high-type participation constraint: the higher is high-types outside opportunity option, the lower
is the likelihood of implementing an optimal rst-period pooling strategy. An interesting extension
to this model is to allow for the presence of a third type of citizens, i.e., a medium-type one. If
country 2 is endowed with three types of agents, countervailing incentives may be a relevant issue
to be taken into account.
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Chapter 2
Three-Type Models
2.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we generalize our previous ndings by introducing a third type of citizens, who are
characterized by an intermediate skill level. It is worth noting that this hypothesis allows us to
better analyze the distributive e¤ects of taxation. In particular, we will show that countervailing
incentives may occur. Medium-type citizens may nd it optimal to mimic high-skilled ones as
a consequence of the interaction between Social Planners desire of redistribution to low-skilled
individuals and high-types migration opportunity to a more favorable tax jurisdiction. In our
framework, a separating scheme can be implemented. However, when countervailing incentives
are a credible issue for the Social Planner, a distortion at the top arises. The term "countervailing
incentives" is due to Lewis and Sappington (1989); theoretical analyses of optimal contracting under
countervailing incentives are provided by Maggi and Rodriguez (1995) and Jullien (2000).
This Chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we rst introduce a third type of
agents, i.e., a medium-skilled citizen. Then, we characterize the optimal non-linear tax scheme
in a second-best closed economy. In section 3, we allow the economy to be open to emigration
of its citizens. We rst analyze the rst-best open economy setting, nding that if only high-
skilled agents can credibly threat to emigrate, there is the well-known "curse" of middle-skilled
workers. Otherwise, redistribution to low-productive agents is heavily bounded. Next, we analyze
di¤erent possible scenarios, assuming labor productivity as private information and that migration
is possible. Depending on the utility level that both medium-skilled and high-skilled can receive
by moving abroad, countervailing incentives may arise. Finally, in section 4, the results are briey
discussed.
2.2 Three-Type Models
We have seen previously that with only two types of citizens, it is never the case that L type
agentsincentives are binding-at-the-optimum, neither to emigrate to country B; nor to mimic the
high skilled ones. This implies that countervailing incentive is not a credible issue for the Social
Planner.
This is no longer the case, when we allow for the existence into As economy of a third continuum
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M (such that
X
i=H;M;L
i = 1) of agents, endowed with a labor productivity !M ; in between !L
and !H ones. Moreover, in order to avoid bunching in asymmetric information settings, we impose
the su¢ cient condition monotonicity of hazard rate on the distribution of labor productivity, such
that
H
M
<
H + M
L
: (2.1)
(2:1) ensures that the downward output distortion decreases when labor productivity increases.
Finally, to further simplify the analysis, we will assume that
!H = (1 + )!M
!M = (1 + )!L
;  > 0;  > 0: (2.2)
In First-Best Closed One-Period Economy setting, the solution to the optimal taxation problem
is such that
v0

yi
!i

!iu0(xi)
= 1; 8i. However, this tax schedule obtained through personalized lump-sum
taxes and subsidizes is not feasible, owing to the existence both of information asymmetry and
opportunity of emigration constraints into the Social Welfare maximization.
2.2.1 Second-Best Optimal Taxation Problem in a closed three-type econ-
omy
By assumption, the tax authority cannot measure each agents labor productivity. If migration to
country B is forbidden, only i-type incentive constraints (i.e. n  (n  1); in this problem there are
6 incentive constraints) and budget balance constraint are real issues. The latter is always binding
at the optimum, but only some of these former are binding as well.
In particular, following the standard literature, we will replace the set of incentive constraints
with two local downward incentive constraints1 :
u(xH)  v

yH
!H

 u(xM )  v

yM
!H

; (HM ) (2.3)
u(xM )  v

yM
!M

 u(xL)  v

yL
!M

; (ML) (2.4)
Therefore, Social Planner
max
xH ;yH ;xM ;yM ;xL;yL
Ws:b:closed (UH ;UM ;UL) =
X
i=H;M;L
i

u(xi)  v

yi
!i

(2.5)
s.t. (2:3), (2:4) and the budget constraintX
i=H;M;L
i (yi   xi)  0; () (2.6)
1The monotonicity of hazard rate condition ensures that monotonicity constraint (i.e.
ysbH
!H
>
ysbM
!M
>
ysbL
!L
) is
strictly satised at the optimal allocation. Therefore, the two local downward incentive constraints imply
u

xsbH

  v
 
ysbH
!H
!
> u

xsbL

  v
 
ysbL
!H
!
;
that is, H-type agents are strictly better by choosing
 
xsbH ; y
sb
H

; instead of
 
xsbL ; y
sb
L

.
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Solving this problem, leads to the following:
Proposition 2.2.1 At the optimal tax schedule (2:6) ; (2:3) and (2:4) are binding and, given as-
sumption (2:1) ; the monotonicity requirement is strictly satised (yH > y

M > y

L, since
yH
!H
>
yM
!M
>
yL
!L
). Therefore, low-type incentive constraints are slack at the optimal allocation. Moreover,
MRSyH ;xH =
v0

ysbH
!H

(1 + ) (1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbH
 = 1 (2.7)
MRSyM ;xM = 1 
HM
M + ML   HM
24 v0

ysbM
!M

(1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbM
   v0

ysbM
!H

(1 + ) (1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbM

35 < 1
(2.8)
where
0 < M =
HM
M + ML   HM
24 v0

ysbM
!M

(1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbM
   v0

ysbM
!H

(1 + ) (1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbM

35 < 1
MRSyL;xL = 1 
ML
L   ML
24 v0

ysbL
!L

!Lu0
 
xsbL
   v0

ysbL
!M

(1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbL

35 < 1 (2.9)
where
0 < M < 

L =
ML
L   ML
24 v0

ysbL
!L

!Lu0
 
xsbL
   v0

ysbL
!M

(1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbL

35 < 1
High-skilled agentsbehavior is not distorted at the margin , while M-type and L-type citizens
are. More precisely:
 H = 0: Most e¢ cient agents face a zero marginal tax rate on income revenue; they only pay
a positive lump-sum tax on yH .
 Both L and M are strictly positive. In particular, by monotone hazard rate,
L =
ML
L   ML
24 v0

ysbL
!L

!Lu0
 
xsbL
   v0

ysbL
!M

(1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbL

35 >
M =
HM
M + ML   HM
24 v0

ysbM
!M

(1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbM
   v0

ysbM
!H

(1 + ) (1 + )!Lu0
 
xsbM

35 > 0:
 Since (2:6) is binding at the optimum, low-skilled individuals receive a positive lump-sum
transfer, while, depending on the value of parameters ; , L; M and H ; medium-type
ones could be subsidized or taxed by a lump-sum amount.
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Corollary 2.2.1 Being monotonicity condition strictly satised at the optimal solution and since
both the Local Downward Incentive constraints are binding, too, we can derive that:(
ysbH
!H
>
ysbM
!M
>
ysbL
!L
xsbH > x
sb
M > x
sb
L
and that
UsbH > U
sb
M > U
sb
L
Moreover, just like in the two-type case, 
UsbH > U

H
UsbL < U

L
;
since 8>>><>>>:
ysbH
!H
= lsbH < l

H
xsbH > x

H
ysbL
!L
= lsbL > l

L
xsbL < x

L
The global e¤ect on M-agents is still ambiguous, and it depends from the parameters.
2.3 Optimal taxation problem in a static open model
As previously, we let now country As citizen migrate to the laissez-faire country B. The only
di¤erence with section (1:3) ; we have a median type of agents. Still assuming that high skilled
citizens could gain from moving, while it is never the case for low ones, depending on medium type
migration costs ci;B and ki;B ; we have to deal with two possible scenarios:
 both high and medium skilled agents can use the threat of migration; it will reduce substan-
tially the redistribution to L fraction of people.
 only high-skilled individuals can gain from migration. It will bring to a lower reduction in
redistribution, by "punishing" M-agents.
Since the utility abroad is, by assumption, increasing in type, UH;B is at least equal to UM;B :
Consequently, it is never the case that, ex ante, only medium skilled agents can credibly threat to
migrate.
2.3.1 First-Best in a static open economy
If the Social Planner knows citizenslabor productivity, the only inevitable limits to redistribution
it has to deal with are the Budget Constraint and the threat of H-type individuals to migrate to
country B. Depending on cM;B and kM;B ; it can be the case that also medium-skilled participation
constraint binds at the optimal solution.
Therefore, As government must solve the following problem:
max
xH;A;yH;A;xM;A;yM;A;xL;A;yL;A
Wf:b:open (UH;A; UM;A; UL;A) =
X
i=H;M;L
i [u(xi;A)  v (li;A)] (2.10)
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s.t. the Budget Constraint X
i=H;M;L
i (!ili;A   xi;A)  0; () (2.11)
H-agentsparticipation constraint
u (xH;A)  v (lH;A)  bUH;B , (H) (2.12)
and, nally, M-agentsparticipation constraint
u (xM;A)  v (lM;A)  bUM;B , (M ) (2.13)
Solving this problem, gives the following:
Proposition 2.3.1 At the optimum,  > 0:
 If both the participation constraints are binding (i.e., H > 0 and M > 0) , using the F.O.Cs
of problem (2:3:1) and rearranging, gives:
1 +
H
H

u0
 
xH;A

=

1 +
M
M

u0
 
xM;A

= u0
 
xL;A

(2.14)
and 
1 + HH

v0
 
lH;A

!L (1 + ) (1 + )
=

1 + MH

v0
 
lM;A

!L (1 + )
=
v0
 
lL;A

!L
(2.15)
 If only (1:21) and (2:12) constraints are binding at the optimum, while (2:13) constraint is
not (i.e.,  > 0; H > 0 and M = 0), we have:
1 +
H
H

u0
 
xH;A

= u0
 
xM;A

= u0
 
xL;A

(2.16)
and 
1 + HH

v0
 
lH;A

!L (1 + ) (1 + )
=
v0
 
lM;A

!L (1 + )
=
v0
 
lL;A

!L
(2.17)
When both high-type and median-type individualsparticipation constraints are binding at the
optimum, they receive exactly their reservation utility, bUH;B and bUM;B ; respectively; H-skilled
agents pay a lump-sum tax equal to (cH;B + kH;B) ; while M-skilled ones pay a lump-sum tax
corresponding to (cM;B + kM;B) :
Since, at the optimum, constraint (2:11) is binding, each low-skilled citizen is subsidized by a
lump-sum amount equal to
H (cH;B + kH;B) + M (cM;B + kM;B)
L
:
Moreover, no marginal tax rate is levied on labor income. Compared to the First-best closed
economy setting, both H-type and M-type agents are better o¤ (and, of course, L-type are worse
o¤).
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Corollary 2.3.1 Since, at the optimum, H-type and M-type individuals are net tax payers (paying
a type-specic lump-sum tax) and the (2:11) is binding, L-agents are subsidized. Therefore, given
also that latters indi¤erence curve is always the steepest in the hy; xi space, we can say that both
high and medium types produce and consume more than low type citizens. Also, we have:
!H l

H;B   (cH;B + kH;B) = xH;B = !H lH;A   T H;A = xH;A > xH;cl:ec:
lH;B = l

H;A < l

H;cl:ec:
!M l

M;B   (cM;B + kM;B) = xM;B = !M lM;A   T M;A = xM;A > xM;cl:ec:
lM;A < l

M;cl:ec:
where 
T H;A = cH;B + kH;B
T M;A = cM;B + kM;B
and 
xL;A > x

L;cl:ec:
lL;A < l

L;cl:ec:
Conversely, if (2:13) is not binding, we have what is called "the curse" of medium productive
citizens. We can think that M-types global cost of migration (i.e., cM;B + kM;B) is so relevant,
that M-citizens strictly prefer to stay in country A, than moving abroad. Compared to the previous
case, they are worse o¤, since they optimally consume as much as low-labor productive agents,
while working more. Conversely, high-skilled agents are una¤ected, since they get the same bundle
as the above-mentioned case (H > 0).
Corollary 2.3.2 Therefore, we have
!H l

H;B   (cH;B + kH;B) = xH;B = !H lH;A   T H;A = xH;A > xH;cl:ec:
lH;B = l

H;A < l

H;cl:ec:
with 
T H;A = cH;B + kH;B
T M;A < cM;B + kM;B
and 
xM;A = x

L;A
lM;A > l

L;A
2.3.2 Second-Best in a static open economy
As usual, we now move to the second-best environment, by assuming that the Social Planner is
unable to observe individual productivity. When maximizing the social welfare, in principle, it has to
deal with the budget constraint, six incentive constraints (two for each type) and two participation
constraints (one for high- and one for medium-types). However, we can neglect low-type incentive
constraints, since, given the assumptions on migration costs (i.e., (ci;B + ki;B) > 0; i = L;M;H), we
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guess that it is never optimal for L-agents to mimic other typesoptimal productions2 . Therefore,
the tax authority will face the following maximization problem:
maxWs:b:open (UH;A;UM;A;UL;A) =
X
i=H;M;L
i

u(xi;A)  v

yi;A
!i

(2.18)
s.t. X
i=H;M;L
i (yi;A   xi;A)  0; () (2.19)
u(xH;A)  v

yH;A
!H

 u(xM;A)  v

yM;A
!H

; (HM ) (2.20)
u(xH;A)  v

yH;A
!H

 u(xL;A)  v

yL;A
!H

; (HL) (2.21)
u(xM;A)  v

yM;A
!M

 u(xH;A)  v

yH;A
!M

; (MH) (2.22)
u(xM;A)  v

yM;A
!M

 u(xL;A)  v

yL;A
!M

; (ML) (2.23)
u (xH;A)  v

yH;A
!H

 bUH;B ; (H) (2.24)
u (xM;A)  v

yM;A
!M

 bUM;B ; (M ) (2.25)
From the solution of Social Planners problem (2:3:2) ; we can derive some Lemmas.
Lemma 2.3.1 (2:19) constraint is always binding at the optimum.
If it wasnt the case, it would have been possible to raise low-agentsconsumption, therefore
increasing the Social Welfare level, up to the equality between LHS and RHS of the social budget
constraint.
Lemma 2.3.2 If (2:20) constraint is binding, (2:22) constraint is not (and vice versa).
2We will give the intuition, by assuming ex-ante it is possible for L-agents to pretend to be medium-productive
citizens (the same argument is valid for L-type mimicking H-type). First, if, at the constrained optimum, M-workers
strictly prefer (or are indi¤erent between the two options) to mimic L-ones, rather than to emigrate to B, it is
straightforward that L-agents are strictly better o¤ when revealing their true type, than mimicking M-citizens.
Therefore, only if bUM;B > u(xL;A)  v  yL;A!M  ; it may be the case that the local upward incentive constraint
u
 
xL;A
  vyL;A
!L

 u  xM;A  vyM;A
!L

is binding at the optimum. However, when receiving bUM;B ; if high-types local downward incentive compatibility
constraint is slack, op:sbM is not positive. Therefore, M-agents pay, at least, a lump-sum tax equal to cM;B + kM;B
to subsidize L-ones. Since, in hy; ci space, L-indi¤erence curve is always steeper, than M-indi¤erence curve, given
L-type lump-sum subsidy and M-type lump sum tax, L-workers local upward incentive compatibility constraint is
strictly satised.
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Since, in hy; xi space, M-citizensindi¤erence curve is always steeper than H-agentsone, it is
not possible that the two curves cross each other twice. Therefore, (2:3:2) is a direct consequence
of single-crossing condition.
Lemma 2.3.3 If (2:24) constraint is not binding at the optimum, (2:20) is.
If H-type agentsmigration opportunity does not provide them an utility level higher than what
they get at the optimum, in the second-best closed economy scenario, the latter result remains valid.
Even if migration is not a credible threat, in order to limit redistribution from them to low-skilled
agents, high-skilled workers can still threaten to mimic M-skilled ones. Therefore, they are levied
a lump-sum tax until (2:20) constraint is binding.
Lemma 2.3.4 If (2:25) constraint is slack at the optimum, (2:23) ; or both (2:23) and (2:22) are
binding.
If M-type agentsmigration is not a credible threat, depending on high- and low-skilleds level of
utility, they can mimic L-type agents, just like in second-best scenario, or both low- and high-skilled
agents. This latter case may arise, if H-citizensreservation utility, i.e., bUH;B , is su¢ ciently high to
make M-agents better o¤ when mimicking H-ones.
Lemma 2.3.5 (2:21) is always slack at the optimum.
Depending on both high- and medium-skilleds outside opportunity, i.e., bUH;B and bUM;B , di¤er-
ent equilibria may arise. In order to present all possible solutions, we start assuming that neither
(2:24), nor (2:25) constraints are binding at the optimum. Then, we let only bUH;B raise, to stress
the negative e¤ect of high-skilleds increased mobility on social welfare. Given globalization, these
are the most likely, and, therefore, interesting, equilibria to be faced in OECD countries, since,
as shown in OECD data (OECD, 2002, 2008), many developed countriesgovernment are worried
by high-skilleds migration to tax havens and almost laissez-faire countries. Finally, in order to
cover also di¤erent possible scenarios, we let bUM;B arises, too. Clearly, such scenarios are not so
common for two simple reasons: i) globalization has multiplied OECD highly-skilled citizensmi-
gration opportunity, rather than medium- and low-skilled agentsones; ii) often the median voter
is a M-type agent. Therefore, an elected democratic government will favor him. However, in very
poor countries, or in economies with a strong redistributive target, it may be the case that, as well
as high-skilled agents, medium skilled citizens are attracted by foreign opportunities, too.
We will not analyze the case where (2:25) is binding at the optimum, while (2:24) is not.
It arises when bUM;B gives M-type a higher utility level, than the constrained optimal Second-Best
closed economy allocation, while high-skilled agents strictly prefer their second-best closed economy
optimal allocation, rather than bUH;B (even if, by assumption, bUH;B > bUM;B). In such a scenario,
(2:20) is tightened, by the increased M-utility level; while (2:23) is relaxed; however, the latter
constraint may be still binding, or slack, if bUM;B is high enough.
Case 2.3.1 (2:19), (2:20) and (2:23) are binding at the optimum.
This case arises when both high- and medium-skilled agentsmigration opportunities are slack
at the second-best closed economy optimal allocation. Therefore, the Social Planners problem in
open economy, coincides with the problem in closed economy.
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Let us assume that bUH;B is such that high-skilled workers are indi¤erent between moving abroad
and mimicking medium agents (i.e., both (2:24) and (2:20) are binding at the constrained optimum).
Depending on M-agentsoutside opportunity, we can face three di¤erent scenarios.
Case 2.3.2 (2:19) ; (2:24), (2:20) and (2:23) are binding at the optimum.
Since (2:24) is binding, H-agents are better o¤ than in closed economy setting. Since high-
types incentive compatibility constraint (2:20) is binding, too, by Lemma (2:3:2), M-agents are not
attracted by mimicking high-skilled ones. Hence no negative marginal tax rate is levied on H-types.
They only pay a lower lump-sum tax, equal to (cH;B + kH;B). Therefore, the Social Planner is able
to redistribute less consumption good to low-agents. If possible, it would o¤set this loss, increasing
M-citizens tax burden. However, this solution is unfeasible, since medium agents can credibly
threat to mimic low ones. Therefore, both M- and L-skilled workers are worse o¤ and (2:23) is
binding.
Under case (2:3:2) ; Social Planners problem is to maximize (2:18) ; subject to (2:19) ; (2:24) ;
(2:20) and (2:23) constraints:
Proposition 2.3.2 At the optimal allocation, all the relevant constraints are binding. Moreover,
MRSyH;A;xH;A =
v0

yop:sbH;A
!H

(1 + ) (1 + )!Lu0

xop:sbH;A
 = 1; (2.26)
MRSyM;A;xM;A = 1 
HM
M + M   HM
2664 v
0

yop:sbM;A
!M

(1 + )!Lu0

xop:sbM;A
   v0

yop:sbM;A
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where
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H-agents are better o¤ compared to the second best closed economy scenario, since they get
exactly bUH;B : Moreover, H;A = 0; they only pay a (reduced) lump sum tax on yop:sbH;A ; equal to
(cH;B + kH;B) : Both M- and L-agents are worse o¤, compared to the second best closed economy
scenario. However, optimal marginal tax rate on M-income is lower, than in closed setting, since
high-types participation constraint allows Social Planner to a¤ord less distortion in M-citizens
production. L-agents are worse o¤, too, since the increased transfer from medium-skilled individuals
can only partially o¤set the decrease of transfer from high-skilled ones:(the bigger is M compared to
H ; the lower will be low-skilled citizensloss). Moreover, since (2:23) is binding at the constrained
optimum, they are downward distorted at the margin, facing a positive marginal tax rate on their
labor income op:sbL;A .
Case 2.3.3 (2:19) ; (2:24), (2:25), (2:20) and (2:23) are binding at the optimum.
This case arises when high-skilled and medium-skilled agentsoutside opportunities, i.e., bUH;B
and bUM;B , respectively, are such that, at the optimum, these former are indi¤erent between em-
igrating to country B, or mimicking M-agents, while these latter are indi¤erent between moving
abroad, or pretending to be L-agents.
At scenario (2:3:3) the Social Planner maximize (2:18) under (2:19) ; (2:24), (2:25), (2:20) and
(2:23) constraints.
Proposition 2.3.3 At case (2:3:3) constrained optimum,  > 0; HM > 0; ML > 0; H > 0 and
M > 0: Furthermore,
MRSyH;A;xH;A = 1;
MRSyM;A;xM;A < 1;
MRSyL;A;xL;A < 1:
Under case (2:3:3), H-agents are levied only a lump-sum tax equal to their total migration
costs. Conversely, both M- and L-citizens productions are marginally downward distorted by
type-depedent marginal tax rates, op:sbM;A > 0 and 
op:sb
L;A > 0. However, both high-skilled and
medium-skilled are better o¤, than in second-best closed case, since they receive exactly bUH;B andbUM;B , respectively. Hence, low-skilled are worse o¤ (otherwise, second-best closed economy optimal
allocation would not optimal), even if M-types increased outside option allows the Government to
levy a low-types marginal tax rate op:sbL;A lower than in closed setting.
Case 2.3.4 (2:19) ; (2:24) ; (2:25) and (2:20) are binding at the optimum.
bUM;B is su¢ ciently high, to make high-skilled agents being indi¤erent between the utility they
can gain by mimicking M-ones, or by emigrating to B. Moreover, bUM;B is such that intermediate-
citizens cannot credibly threaten to mimic both high-skilled and low skilled fractions of people.
Under case (2:3:4) ; the tax authority maximizes (2:18) ; subject to (2:19) ; (2:24) ; (2:25) and
(2:20) constraints.
Proposition 2.3.4 At the constrained optimum, (2:19) ; (2:24) ; (2:25) and (2:20) constraints are
binding. Moreover,
MRSyH;A;xH;A = 1 (2.29)
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MRSyM;A;xM;A < 1 (2.30)
MRSyL;A;xL;A =
v0

ysbL;A
!H

!Lu0

xsbL;A
 = 1 (2.31)
Under Proposition (2:3:4), H-agentsutility level coincides with bUH;B : Moreover, H;A = 0; they
only pay a (even more reduced) lump sum tax on yop:sbH;A ; equal to (cH;B + kH;B) : M-agents receive
exactly bUM;B : However, being constraint (2:20) binding at the optimal allocation, they middle-
class citizens face a positive marginal tax rate on their labor income, op:sbM;A > 0: Finally, since
both H- and M- types are, thanks to migration opportunity, better o¤, and being (2:19) binding
at the optimal solution, just like under case (2:3:3) L-individuals are worse o¤, compared to closed
setting. Low-skilled agents face no marginal tax rate, since (2:23) is strictly satised at the optimal
allocation, and receive a, limited but still positive, lump-sum subsidy.
Let us now assume that bUH;B is high enough, and, therefore, is such that high-skilled workers are
strictly better o¤ by emigrating to laissez-faire country B, rather than by pretending to be medium
agents (i.e., (2:24) constraint is binding at the optimum, while (2:20) is not). Furthermore, we
assume that (2:25) is strictly satised at the optimum. Two possible scenarios may arise.
Case 2.3.5 (2:19) ; (2:24) and (2:23) are binding at the optimum.
This case is likely to arise in developed countries with redistribution as a main political goal.
High-skilled agentsmust receive their abroad utility level, i.e., bUH;B ; while neither L-type nor M-
type citizens have credible outside options. Hence, since H-agents only pay a small lump-sum tax,
the Social Planner would desire to o¤set this loss, by levying a relevant tax burden on M-income.
As a consequence, a worker belonging to middle-class can credibly mimicking a low-skilled one.
Therefore, Social Planners problem is to maximize (2:18) ; subject to (2:19) ; (2:24) and (2:23) :
Proposition 2.3.5 At the optimal allocation under scenario (2:3:5) ; (2:19) ; (2:24) and (2:23) are
all binding. Moreover,
MRSyH;A;xH;A = 1 (2.32)
MRSyM;A;xM;A = 1 (2.33)
MRSyL;A;xL;A < 1 (2.34)
At the optimal solution of the social welfare maximization problem, under case (2:3:5), we
have that H agents are better o¤ compared with the second best closed economy scenario, since
the Social Planner, in order to keep them in country A, has to give exactly what they could get
abroad, i.e., bUH;B : Moreover, H;A = 0; they only pay a (reduced) lump sum tax on yop:sbH;A ; equal
to (cH;B + kH;B), since (2:22) constraint is strictly satised at the optimal allocation. More, even
if op:sbM;A = 0; medium-skilled agents are worse o¤, compared both with the second-best closed
economy scenario and with (2:3:2) case, since, with respect to this latter setting, bUH;B ; ceteris
paribus, has to be higher. As a consequence, the increased high-productive agents reservation
utility reduces the redistribution to the lowest skilled ones. This fact relaxes (2:23) ; therefore,
the tax authority can levy additional lump-sum tax on medium-type citizens in order to subsidize
L fraction of population (until (2:23) is binding) , under (2:19) constraint: Last, with respect
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to both closed economy and (2:3:2) cases, L-agents are worse o¤, too, since the transfer from
medium-skilled individuals can only partially o¤set the decrease of subsidies from high-productive
workers:(the bigger is MH fraction; the lower is low-skilled citizens loss). Moreover, they are
downward distorted at the margin, facing a positive marginal tax rate on their labor income, i.e.
op:sbL;A > 0:
Case 2.3.6 (2:19) ; (2:24), (2:22) and (2:23) are binding at the optimum.
Starting from (2:3:5), assume high-skilleds outside opportunity bUH;B further increases, (i.e.,
H-agents migration costs are further lower) This may be seen as a consequence of increasing
globalization. Hence, it may be the case that M-individuals can have an incentive to mimic H-ones,
i.e., countervailing incentive is a credible issue for the Social Planner. In order to avoid pooling at
the top, most skilled agentsproduction will be optimally upward distorted at the margin. Moreover,
medium-skilled agents still have an incentive to mimic L-ones, since, under this scenario, bUM;B is
strictly lower than the utility M-agents can get by preteding to be low-skilled ones. As usual, in
order to avoid pooling at the bottom, least-skilled agentsproduction will be downward distorted
at the margin.
The Social Planner will maximize (2:18) ; subject to (2:19) ; (2:24), (2:22) and (2:23) :
Proposition 2.3.6 At the constrained optimum, the relevant constraints are all binding, i.e.,
 > 0; HM > 0; H > 0: Moreover,
MRSyH;A;xH;A = 1 +
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where
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3775 > 0;
MRSyM;A;xM;A = 1; (2.36)
MRSyL;A;xL;A < 1: (2.37)
High-skilled agents receive exactly bUH;B : However, since, under case (2:3:6) we assumed that
H-types migration opportunity bUH;B is higher, because of M-agents threat of mimicking high-
skilled workers, i.e., (2:22) is binding;most skilled individualsproduction is upward distorted at
the margin through an implicit negative marginal tax rate op:sbH;A < 0: This tax schedule will
reduce (up to indi¤erence) the incentive of M-citizens of pretending to be H-ones. Hence, since
these latter are marginally subsidized on their labor income, they, must pay a lump-sum tax higher
than (cH;B + kH;B) : Conversely, M-agents are not distorted at the margin, i.e., t
op:sb
M;A = 0. It
is reasonable to say that they are worse o¤, with respect to (2:3:6) case. Indeed, the increased
high-types outside opportunity level bUH;B reduces the redistribution to low-skilled individuals.
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This relaxes the incentive of medium-type population to mimic them, i.e., relaxes (2:23) constraint.
Therefore, Social Planner can increase M-agentslump-sum tax (or, depending on parameters, to
further reduce their lump-sum subsidy) until (2:23) constraint is, again, binding. Finally, low-skilled
agents are worse o¤, too, since the increased bUH;B level a¤ects them negatively. Moreover, in order
to avoid a partial pooling of medium- and low-types, these latter are downward distorted at the
margin, facing a positive marginal tax rate on their labor income op:sbL;A > 0:
Again, let us assume that high-skilled workers are strictly better o¤ by emigrating to laissez-
faire country B, rather than by pretending to be medium agents, and that medium-typesmigration
threat is credible. This means that bUM;B is strictly higher than the utility M-agents receive at the
second-best closed economy optimum.
Case 2.3.7 (2:19) ; (2:24), (2:25) and (2:23) are binding at the optimum.
This scenario arises when both M- and H-agents have a credible outside option. Their partici-
pation constraints are binding at the optimal second-best closed economy setting. Moreover, bUH;B
is strictly higher than the RHS of (2:20) ; therefore, there is no need of a downward distortion of
intermediate agents. Conversely, even if these latter are better o¤, they are still indi¤erent between
moving abroad and pretending to be low-type agents. Hence, a positive marginal tax rate on L-
types income is optimal. Just like the following (2:3:8) case, this scenario is common in country
with signicant redistributional goals, where moving abroad is a really protable option for H-type
(such that (2:20) constraint is slack, but not enough to make M-agents, at least, indi¤erent between
emigrating and mimicking high-skilled people) and is a credible threat for M-agents, too.
Therefore, the Social Planner maximizes (2:18) ; subject to (2:19) ; (2:24) ; (2:25) and (2:23).
Proposition 2.3.7 At the optimal allocation, with all the relevant constraints, i.e., (2:19) ; (2:24),
(2:25) and (2:23) ; being binding, we have
MRSyH;A;xH;A = 1;
MRSyM;A;xM;A = 1;
and
MRSyL;A;xL;A < 1:
Qualitatively, this case is similar to (2:3:5) case. However, under case (2:3:7)M-agents are better
o¤, since they get exactly bUM;B : Hence, it is optimal to reduce op:sbL;A , until (2:23) is binding. Even
if L-agentsoptimal income is less downward distorted, assuming bUH;B coincident with the utility
level high-skilled workers obtain in (2:3:5) case (i.e., cH;B + kH;B unchanged), since M-agents are
better o¤, low-skilled are worse o¤. Both M- and H-citizens are levied a personalized lump-sum
tax, equal to type-specic migration costs, while low-type ones received a lump-sum subsidy and
face a positive marginal tax rate on their labor income, i.e., op:sbL;A > 0.
Case 2.3.8 (2:19) ; (2:24) and (2:25) are binding at the optimum.
This case arises when both high-skilled and medium skilled agentsoutside opportunity levels,
i.e., bUH;B and bUM;B ; are su¢ ciently high to relax all their incentive compatibility constraints.
Actually, a higher bUM;B tightens (2:20), but not enough to make the most productive workers
indi¤erent between threaten to moving abroad and mimicking medium-productive citizens:This
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scenario may be faced in developed countries with important redistributional target, when migration
costs are relatively low (for example, migration within EU). Qualitatively, case (2:3:8) corresponds
to the, already analyzed, First-Best one-period open economy scenario. As already shown, there is
no need for distorting marginal tax rate on labor income. Consequently, high- and medium-type
workers receive exactly what they would get abroad, respectively, bUH;B and bUM;B ; paying lump-
sum taxes equal to their own migration costs (respectively, (cH;B + kH;B) and (cM;B + kM;B)). each
L-agent receives a lump-sum subsidy corresponding to H(cH;B+kH;B)+M (cM;B+kM;B)L :
Case 2.3.9 (2:19) ; (2:24) ; (2:25) and (2:22) are binding at the optimum.
Whenever bUH;B is so high, that, not only (2:20) constraint is no longer an issue, but M-agents
can credibly mimick to be H-ones, countervailing incentives may, as in case (2:3:6), arise: The only
novelty in this scenario is that M-agents can gain from moving abroad, too. Therefore, with respect
to case (2:3:6) ; middle-class citizens are better o¤, since, at the optimum, they get, exactly, bUM;B .
Since both M- and H-agents receive they what they would obtain if emigration to laissez-faire
country B, low-skilled fraction of citizens are, now, worse o¤.
Since we assumed that medium-productive workers are indi¤erent (at the constrained optimum)
between mimic high-agents and emigrating, in order to avoid pooling at the top, the government
nds optimal to distort upward these lattermarginal production, up to indi¤erence of M-agents.
Therefore, Social Planners problem is to maximize (2:18) ; subject to (2:19) ; (2:24) ; (2:25) and
(2:22) :
Proposition 2.3.8 At the optimal solution,
MRSyH;A;xH;A > 1; (2.38)
MRSyM;A;xM;A = 1; (2.39)
MRSyL;A;xL;A = 1:
At the optimal solution, both H- and M-workers receive an utility equal to their outside oppor-
tunity. However, high-agentsproduction is marginally upward distorted, i.e., op:sbH;A < 0; since the
Social Planner wants to avoid medium-skilled agents mimicking them. They also are levied a posi-
tive lump-sum tax, higher than (cH;B + kH;B) ; while M-agents pay a lump-sum amount coincident
with their migration costs, i.e., cM;B +kM;B : Low-skilled agents face a reduction in their lump-sum
subsidy; more, the higher bUH;B and bUM;B , the lower is L-agent lump-sum subsidy: Finally, no
marginal tax rate is levied on low-labor productive agentsoutput.
2.4 Conclusions
In Chapter 1, we have analyzed the e¤ect of high skilled workersmigration threat on social welfare.
As we have shown, in both a static and two-period framework, the redistribution from H-agents
to L-type ones is even more reduced, if high types participation constraints are binding. This
second-best solution is far away from the rst best one. However, the model in Chapter 1 lies on
some simplifying assumptions, which a¤ect our results. In particular, (i) the absence of country Bs
citizens as possible immigrants in country A and (ii) the existence of only two types of agents, i.e.
H- and L-individuals. In this Chapter we generalized our analysis by introducing a third type of
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agents, endowed with intermediate skill: Such an extension allow us to better analyze the e¤ects on
redistribution of both adverse selection and migration opportunities arising simultaneously. Even in
a static framework, the presence of middle class agents has a relevant e¤ect on results. In particular,
in a rst-best open economy setting, we nd the well known "curse" of middle-skilled workers, if
H-types outside option is not binding at the optimum, while H-types one is. Otherwise, if both
H- and M-agents can credibly threahen to moving abroad, the redistribution to low-skilled citizens
is heavily bounded. In the second-best scenario, the number of possible solution has increased
dramatically. Depending on the utility that both H- and M-agents can get by moving abroad, or by
mimicking a di¤erent type of agents, we obtain di¤erent optimal allocations. In particular, when
high-skilled citizensutility from migration is so high that M-agents are better o¤ when mimicking
H-ones, rather than revealing their own type, the Social Planner deals with binding countervailing
incentives. Given globalization, such scenarios are always more likely to be faced, since developed
countriesredistributional goal conicts with increasing high-skilleds migration opportunity. For
this reason, we believe that this topic deserves attention and further investigation. In particular,
we leave to future research the study of optimal tax policy in a dynamic context. It may be the
case that for the Social Planner it is optimal to let a certain fraction of high and medium type
individuals go abroad in period 1. The e¤ects of this strategy are twofold. In period 1, such a
policy could make a (partial) separating equilibrium less costly. It is worth noting that in such a
framework, migrated agents may have an incentive to come back to country A. This is due to the
fact that the Social Planner cannot distinguish their type. Di¤erently, in the two-type case, the
only agents who credibly threat to migrate are the high-skilled ones. Therefore, by moving abroad,
indirectly they would reveal themselves. Another relevant extension is a two-country setting model,
with possibility of emigration and immigration. As a consequence, a proper choice of the social
welfare function to be used, becomes necessary. Indeed, an utilitarian social welfare function may
imply that a huge low-skilled country is preferable. Conversely, a per-capita social welfare function
may imply that it is optimal to let all low-skilled agents migrate.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Taxation of Capital with
asymmetric information
3.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we analyze the e¤ects of optimal entrepreneurial capital taxation on social welfare
when e¤ort and individual labor productivity may be private information. In an economy populated
by two continua of entrepreneurs, di¤ering in their skills, if e¤ort is private information, individuals
are subject to dynamic moral hazard. Under this scenario, if the Social Planner aims to induce all
agents to exert high e¤ort, it is socially optimal that both types of citizens are partially insured.
Moreover, in order to discourage savings, each fraction of population face a positive type-dependent
intertemporal wedge. Then, we study what happens when adverse selection arises. Under the same
assumptions about Social Planners desires, we show that is optimal to full insure high-skilled agents
and to partially insure low-skilled ones. Moreover, no high-type aggregate intertemporal wedge is
implemented, while a positive L-aggregate intertemporal wedge is. Finally, we study the e¤ects
of both dynamic moral hazard and adverse selection on social welfare, nding that both type are
partially insured and that the interaction between moral hazard and adverse selection amplies
each other.
There is a recent, but growing literature, called New Dynamic Public Finance, that applies
Mirrlees (1971) approach to optimal taxation of labor extending it in a dynamic framework. The
main goal is to analyze the trade-o¤ between insurance and incentive. A specic branch of this
research is related to optimal taxation of entrepreneurial activity. Golosov, Kocherlakota and
Tsyvinsky (2003) show that, with additive separable utility function, if it optimal that future
consumption is random given present information, distortions on consumption (wedges) path arise.
Albanesi and Sleet (2006) use a similar utility function, nding a positive intertemporal wedge
between the social optimum and the individual one. Furthermore, optimal marginal tax rate on
capital income decreases in setting with labor risk. Albanesi (2006) studies optimal taxation of
entrepreneurial capital with private information and multiple assets. In her setup, entrepreneurial
activity is subject to a dynamic moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic capital
risk. Given this framework she shows that di¤erential asset taxation is optimal. Moreover marginal
taxes on bonds are proven to depend on the correlation of their returns with idiosyncratic capital
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risk. In such a context, therefore, entrepreneurial capital always receives a subsidy relative to other
assets in the bad states.
We focus, basically, on Albanesi (2006) work and we try to extend it. It is worth noting
that Albanesis analysis is based on the assumption that only one type of entrepreneur exists.
However, entrepreneurial ideas and skill are not equally distributed among people. For this reason,
in this Chapter we depart from the Albanesi framework by introducing both low- and high-skilled
agents. As a consequence, we will also be able to study optimal taxation under adverse selection.
If e¤ort is private information, while labor productivity is common knowledge, we nd results
close to Albanesi (2006): both high-skilled agents and low-skilled agents are partially insured.
Moreover, there are positive intertemporal wedges between both medium- and high-types aggregate
return of investment and their intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. Conversely, when only
labor productivity is private information, high-skilled agents are fully insured, and no H-aggregate
intertemporal wedge arises, while low-skilled are over-insured. In addition, a positive L-aggregate
intertemporal wedge is optimal. Finally, we study the e¤ects of both dynamic moral hazard and
adverse selection on social welfare, nding that both type are partially insured and both H-aggregate
intertemporal wedge and L-aggregate intertemporal wedge are positive.
In section 2 we describe the basic setup. In section 3, we analyze a model where e¤ort is private
information. Then, in section 4, we focus on adverse selection, assuming that labor productivity
is private information, while e¤ort is not. In section 5, we analyze a model where both e¤ort and
labor productivity are private information. Finally, in section 6, we give a brief conclusion. Proofs
of propositions are in appendix.
3.2 The Set Up
Let us introduce a two-period economy, that is populated by two types of entrepreneurs: low- (L)
and high-productivity (H) ones. Denoting their productivity by i, i = H;L; we assume that the
inequality H > L always holds. Moreover, productivity parameters do no change over time.
We also assume a continuum of entrepreneurs. Normalizing to one their distribution, the fraction
of high-skilled workers (H-agents, hereafter) then be  2 (0; 1) ; and hence, (1  ) 2 (0; 1) will be
the fraction of low-skilled ones (L-agents). By assumption, agents live for two periods and share
identical additive and separable (across arguments) utility functions, given by:
U = u (c0) + u (c1)  v (e) ;
where ct is consumption at time t; with t = 0; 1; e = f0; 1g is e¤ort spent at time t = 0 and  2 (0; 1)
is the relevant discount factor: As can be seen, e¤ort is dichotomous and is optimally chosen after
the agent sets the consumption level at time 0 (c0).
As usual, u (ct), t = 0; 1 (u0 > 0; u00 < 0 limct!0 u
0 (ct) = 1) is the utility of consumption in
period 0 and period 1; while v (e) (v0 > 0; v00 > 0) is the disutility of e¤ort.
It is worth noting that agents choose not only their own consumption levels over time, but also
decide how much to invest at time 0. In other words, given the initial endowment of resources
k0 > 0 (in terms of units of consumption good), the entrepreneur chooses k1; with 0  k1  k0: At
time 1, agent i will receive a gross return equal to
R (ki1; x; i) = ki1 (1 + x) ;
where x is a random variable. By assumption its realization of x will be either x;with probability
 (i; ei) ; or x; with probability 1   (i; ei) ; with x > x:
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As usual, the probability  (i; ei) is a positive function of e¤ort. Moreover, the inequality
 (1j i) >  (0j i) ; i = H;L; holds. This means that an agent endowed with type  has a higher
expected investment return by exerting e = 1, rather than e = 0 (i.e., E( 1ji) [x] > E( 0ji) [x]) and
 (H j eH = e) >  (Lj eL = e) : So, given a certain level of exerted e¤ort, high-skilled agents have
higher expected investment return, than low-skilled ones (i.e., E( H jeH=e) [x] > E( LjeL=e) [x]).
Finally, notice that  (H ; 0) R  (L; 1). This means that high-skilled agentsexpected invest-
ment return, given low e¤ort (eH = 0), may be higher, equal, or lower than low-skilled citizens
one, when these latter exert high e¤ort (eL = 1). As a consequence, we have
E(H ;1) [x] > E(H ;0) [x] R E(L;1) [x] > E(L;0) [x] :
Notice that is return depends on both individual productivity i and e¤ort ei: Therefore, the
amount of capital ki1 is agent-specic and capital risk is idiosyncratic.
It is worth noting that: i) consumption in both periods (i.e., c0 and c1), ii) investment , Ki1; 8i;
iii) the realized value of x and its distribution, and iv) the distribution of  are common knowledge.
Depending on some specic assumptions, which will be introduced later, agent is labor productivity
i and e¤ort ei, 8i, may be private information.
By assumption, the Social Planner is a benevolent utilitarian one. In order to maximize social
welfare, it chooses a state-contingent level of consumption and e¤ort allocation, conditional on k0.
Also, we assume that the Social Planner cannot redistribute the endowment k0 across agents.
3.3 Pure Moral Hazard Model
Let start with a model, where only e¤ort is private information. This framework is similar to
that described in Albanesi (2006), with one important exception: unlike Albanesi, who assumes
that agents have the same productivity, we let agents be heterogeneous: agents di¤er in individual
productivity i, although, for the moment, this is assumed to be common knowledge. Under these
assumptions, since the expected investment return is stochastic and increasing in unobservable
e¤ort, the ability of entrepreneurs to save a positive amount of resources at time 0 reduces the
dependence of future consumption on the realization of uncertainty and, therefore, on e¤ort. This
means that the Social Planner faces a (dynamic) moral hazard problem: higher risk-free wealth
insures citizens against negative future outcome, thereby discouraging a high level of e¤ort.
The Social Planners problem is
max
ei2f0;1g; k1i2[0;k0]; c0i;c1i(x)0; i=H;L



u (c0H) + E(H ;eH)u (c1H (x))  v (eH)

+(1  ) u (c0L) + E(L;eL)u (c1L (x))  v (eL) (3.1)
subject to
c0H + k1H  k0; (3.2)
c0L + k1L  k0; (3.3)
() E(H ;eH) [c1H (x)] + (1  )E(L;eL) [c1L (x)] (3.4)
 k1HE(H;eH) [1 + x] + (1  ) k1LE(L;eL) [1 + x] ;
(H) E(H ;1) [u (c1H (x))]  v (1)  E(H;0) [u (c1H (x))]  v (0) ; (3.5)
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(L) E(L;1) [u (c1L (x))]  v (1)  E(L;0) [u (c1L (x))]  v (0) ; (3.6)
where (3:2), (3:3) and (3:4) are the rst-period high-skilled and low-skilled agents budget con-
straints (since the Social Planner cannot make any transfer across agent during t = 0) and second-
period social budget constraint, respectively. Moreover inequalities (3:5) and (3:6) denote high-type
and low-type incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), respectively, for any level of e¤ort. This
means that we are implicitly assuming that the Government nds optimal that all agents exert
high e¤ort1 . Given this problem, we can write the following:
Proposition 3.3.1 At the constrained optimal allocation
eH ; e

L; k
m:h:
H1 ; k
m:h:
L1 ; c
m:h:
H0 ; c
m:h:
L0 ; c
m:h:
H1 (x) ; c
m:h:
H1 (x) ; c
m:h:
L1 (x) ; c
m:h:
L1 (x)
	
;
when eH = e

L = 1,  > 0; H > 0 and L > 0: Moreover,
km:h:1H > k
m:h:
1L ; (3.7)
u0
 
cm:h:1H (x)

u0
 
cm:h:1H (x)
 =
h
1 + H(H)(H;1)
i
h
1  H(H)(1 (H;1))
i > 1; (3.8)
u0
 
cm:h:0H

E(H;1)
"
1
u0
 
cm:h:1H (x)
# = E(H ;1) (1 + x) ; (3.9)
u0
 
cm:h:1L (x)

u0
 
cm:h:1L (x)
 =
h
1 + L(L)(1 a)(L;1)
i
h
1  L(L)(1 a)(1 (L;1))
i > 1; (3.10)
u0
 
cm:h:0L

E(L;1)
"
1
u0
 
cm:h:1L (x)
# = E(L;1) (1 + x) ; (3.11)
where  (i) =  (i; 1)  (i; 0) : Moreover, since both (3:5) and (3:6) are binding at the optimum,
if
 (H) >  (L) ; (3.12)
we derive
u
 
cm:h:1L (x)
  u  cm:h:1L (x) > u  cm:h:1H (x)  u  cm:h:1H (x) : (3.13)
Proposition (3:3:1) deserves some comment. Inequality (3:7) means that the Social Planner
nds it optimal to induce H-agents to invest more, than L-agents (and therefore, cm:h:H0 < c
m:h:
L0 ).
Since the return on investment is linear in capital and since at eH = e

L = 1; E(H ;1) [1 + x] >
E(L;1) [1 + x] ; the Government can increase transfer across agents at time t = 1; after the realiza-
tion of x:
1Depending on parameters, It may also be the case that the Social Planner nds optimal to incentivate only one
type of agents to exert high e¤ort, usually H-type one. In a model without adverse selection, at the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation H-type agents are partially insured, with eH = 1, while L-type ones are fully insured, with e

L = 0:
We leave this analisys (both in pure moral hazard setting and in mixed setting) to future research.
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Inequality (3:8) implies that high-skilled agents are partially insured. Since eH is private infor-
mation, partial insurance incentives them to exert high e¤ort, by increasing the di¤erence
E(H ;1) [u (c1H (x))]  E(H;0) [u (c1H (x))]
	
:
By the same reasoning, inequality (3:10) implies partial insurance for L-agents.
From (3:9), by Jensens inequality, we derive
u0
 
cm:h:0H

E(H;1)

u0
 
cm:h:1H (x)
 < E(H ;1) (1 + x) : (3.14)
In other words, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution H-agents is strictly lower than the
discounted expected H-agents aggregate intertemporal rate of transformation. This means that
there is a positive wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation, due to limit H-agents  saving in
t = 0, in order to increase their expected consumption in t = 1: H-agents aggregate positive
intertemporal wedge is:
IWm:h:H = E(H ;1) (1 + x)E(H;1)

u0
 
cm:h:1H (x)
  u0  cm:h:0H  (3.15)
=


E(H ;1) (1 + x)H (H)

u0
 
cm:h:1H (x)
  u0  cm:h:1H (x) > 0:
Similarly, from (3:11) ; we have
u0
 
cm:h:0L

E(L;1)

u0
 
cm:h:1L (x)
 < E(L;1) (1 + x) : (3.16)
Then, L-aggregate positive intertemporal wedge is therefore equal to
IWm:h:L = E(L;1) (1 + x)E(L;1)

u0
 
cm:h:1L (x)
  u0  cm:h:0L  (3.17)
=

1  E(L;1) (1 + x)L (L)

u0
 
cm:h:1L (x)
  u0  cm:h:1L (x) > 0:
Clearly, when  is equal to either 0 or 1, there is only one type of agent and, therefore, we nd the
same results as Albanesi (2006).
3.4 Pure Adverse Selection
Let us now assume that the distribution of  is common knowledge, although individual productivity
is private information. Unlike Albanesi (2006), e¤ort is now public information. Again, we assume
that the Social Planner nds optimal that both types of agents exert ei = 1; i = H;L: In this case,
a high-e¤ort level can be obtained with no cost, since variable e is observable. So, it can force
them. According to the standard literature on optimal taxation with adverse selection, agent is
production function is deterministic, i.e.,
Ri = ieiki1:
Therefore, if agent i wants to mimic agent j;he has to invest kj1 unit of capital (assuming this
variable is common knowledge) and exert an e¤ort ei 6= ei (usually, is e¤ort is private information)
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such that i ei = jej : In our framework, the per-unit of capital investment return is stochastic, with
only two possible values, i.e., (1 + x), or (1 + x). Therefore, from the realization of uncertainty, even
if each agents e¤ort is public information, the Social planner cannot infer his labor productivity.
The only way to separate its citizens (if it is optimal), is to induce them to invest di¤erent amount
of money, i.e., ka:s:H1 6= ka:s:L1 : From inequality (3:7) ; we see that the Social Planner nds optimal
to induce high-skilled workers to save more, than low-skilled ones. As a consequence, we guess that
high-skilled agents may choose to mimic low-type agentska:s:L1 ; therefore increasing their optimal
t = 0 consumption ca:s:H0 . As a result, t = 1 social budget constraint is tightened, with respect to
pure moral-hazard case, and, therefore, transfer across agents is reduced.
Hence, the Social Planner, when maximizing the social welfare function, in order to avoid
pooling, has to take into account the following high-types incentive compatibility constraint
u (cH0)  v (1) + E(H ;1) [u (cH1 (x))]  u (cL0)  v (1) + E(H ;1) [u (c1L (x))] :
Finally, we neglect the low-types incentive compatibility constraint, since we guessed that
the Social Planners problem arises from high-type ability of claiming to be low-skilled, in or-
der to limit redistribution at his expenses. We check ex-post if the constrained optimal allocation
(eL; k
a:s:
L1 ; c
a:s:
L0 ; c
a:s:
L1 (x) ; c
a:s:
L1 (x)) strictly satises it.
Therefore, the Social Planners problem is:
maxei2f0;1g; k1i2[0;k0]; c0i;c1i(x)0; i=H;L



u (c0H) + E(H ;eH)u (c1H (x))  v (eH)

+(1  ) u (c0L) + E(L;eL)u (c1L (x))  v (eL)
(3.18)
subject to
c0H + k1H  k0; (3.19)
c0L + k1L  k0; (3.20)
() E(H ;eH) [c1H (x)] + (1  )E(L;eL) [c1L (x)]
 k1HE(H;eH) [1 + x] + (1  ) k1LE(L;eL) [1 + x] ; (3.21)
(H) u (c0H)  v (1) + E(H ;1) [u (c1H (x))]  u (c0L)  v (1) + E(H;1) [u (c1L (x))] : (3.22)
As can be seen, both period 0 and period 1 budget constraints are unchanged. Moreover, since,
at the optimum, (3:19) and (3:20) constraints imply, respectively, ca:s:0H=k0   ka:s:1H and ca:s:OL =
k0   ka:s:1L ; we can slightly modify (3:22) constraint:
(H) E(H ;1) [u (c1H (x))]  E(H;1) [u (c1L (x))]  u (k0   k1L)  u (k0   k1H) : (3.23)
Therefore, the e¤ect of adverse selection is clear: only if rewarded in period 1, in expected terms,
high-type citizens choose to consume less in period 0 (we have already shown that the Social
Planner nds optimal to force high-skilled agents to save more, than low-skilled ones). Otherwise,
constraint (3:21) is tightened, since high-skilled entrepreneurs invest k1L < k

1H and, therefore,
expected redistribution across agents is reduced. Solving Problem 3.4 gives the following:
Proposition 3.4.1 At the constrained optimal allocation
feH ; eL; ka:s:H1 ; ka:s:L1 ; ca:s:H0 ; ca:s:L0 ; ca:s:H1 (x) ; ca:s:H1 (x) ; ca:s:L1 (x) ; ca:s:L1 (x)g ;
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when eH = e

L = 1, both  > 0 and H > 0; while the neglected low-skilleds incentive constraint is
slack. Moreover, we have
ka:s1H < k
m:h:
1H ; (3.24)
ka:s:1L > k
m:h:
1L ; (3.25)
u0 (ca:s:1H (x))
u0 (ca:s:1H (x))
=

1 + H

1 + H
 = 1; (3.26)
u0 (ca:s:0H ) = u
0 (ca:s:1H )E(H ;1) (1 + x) ; (3.27)
u0 (ca:s:1L (x))
u0 (ca:s:1L (x))
=
h
1  H(1 ) (H ;1)(L;1)
i
h
1  H(1 ) (1 (H ;1))(1 (L;1))
i < 1; (3.28)
u0 (ca:s:0L )E(L;1)

1
u0 (ca:s:1L (x))

= E(L;1) (1 + x) : (3.29)
It is worth noting that the existence of inequalities (3:24) and (3:25) is due to the incentive
compatibility constraint of high-skilled agents. The reasoning is as follows: in order to induce H-
type agents to reveal their type, ca:s:0H must be higher and c
a:s:
0L must be lower than under a pure
moral-hazard context. Also, from equations (3:63) and (3:64) we can see that there is full insurance
for H-type agents (i.e., ca:s:1H (x) = c
a:s:
1H (x)). Moreover, from equations (3:63) ; (3:65) and (3:66) is
straightforward show that ca:s:1H is higher than both c
a:s:
1L (x) and c
a:s:
1L (x). This means that c
a:s:
1H
is higher than E(H ;1) [c
a:s:
1L (x)]. Since high-skilled agentsincentive compatibility constraint (3:23)
is binding at the optimum, i.e.,
u (ca:s:1H )  E(H;1) [u (ca:s:1L (x))] = u (k0   ka:s:1L )  u (k0   ka:s:1H ) ;
and, given u0 > 0, we have
u (ca:s:1H )  E(H;1)u (ca:s:1L (x)) > 0:
Hence, we have
[u (k0   ka:s:1L )  u (k0   ka:s:1H )] > 0;
or equivalently,
ka:s:1H > k
a:s:
1L : (3.30)
Given these results, we can therefore say that, at the constrained optimum, the spread (ka:s:1H   ka:s:1L )
is lower than the one under moral hazard, i.e.,
 
km:h:1H   km:h:1L

. However, high-skilled agents are
still induced to save more than low-skilled ones.
Equality (3:26) implies that high-skilled agents are fully insured. High-skilled agentsoptimal
e¤ort is common knowledge, hence the Social Planner can force them to exert eH = 1: Moreover, at
the optimum, low-skilleds incentive constraint is strictly satised. Therefore, there is no distortion
at the top. Conversely, from inequality (3:28) a bit counterintuitive result arises: low-skilled agents
are over-insured (rather than under-insured) at the optimum, i.e.,
ca:s:1L (x) > c
a:s:
1L (x) :
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This result is due to Social Planners attempt to minimize H-agentsinformational rent. Since,
when mimicking L-agents, high-skilled agents have strictly higher probability to get x return
(since  (H ; 1) >  (L; 1)), if ca:s:1L (x) > c
a:s:
1L (x) ; we immediately derive E(H ;1)u (c
a:s:
1L (x)) <
E(L;1)u (c
a:s:
1L (x)) : Therefore, the Social Planner relaxes high-types incentive compatibility con-
straint. Hence, the Social Planner can decrease c0H (thereby increasing k1H), increasing t = 1
expected output (and, consequently, expected t = 1 redistribution), until H-agents are indi¤erent
between the optimal allocation designed for them and the one designed for L-agents. Clearly, in
order to o¤er ca:s:1L (x) > c
a:s:
1L (x), the Social Planner should harshly tax L-agents investment
return, when x occurs, and subsidizes low-consumption ca:s:1L ; when x occurs.
Equality (3:27) shows that H-agentsintertemporal marginal rate of substitution coincides with
the discounted expected H-agentsaggregate intertemporal rate of transformation. Since high-skilled
agents are fully insured, they do not desire to save more than the social optimal level. Therefore,
there is no need to introduce a wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation, i.e.,
IW a:s:H = 0: (3.31)
Finally, from (3:29), by Jensens inequality, we obtain
u0 (ca:s:0L )
E(L;1) [u
0 (ca:s:1L (x))]
< E(L;1) (1 + x) : (3.32)
Like the pure moral-hazard case analyzed by Albanesi (2006), L-agentsintertemporal marginal rate
of substitution is strictly lower than the discounted expected L-agentsaggregate intertemporal rate
of transformation. Again, there is a positive wedge in L-agentsintertemporal Euler equation. Since,
from high-skilleds incentive compatibility constraint, ca:s:1L (x) > c
a:s:
1L (x) ; low-skilled agents would
prefer to exert eL = 0; in order to minimize the probability of having a per-unit of k1L investment
return equal to (1 + x). However, e¤ort is public information. Therefore, low-skilled agents are
forced by the Social Planner to exert eL = 1: Hence, they would like to move consumption from
t = 0 to t = 1; by saving more than the social optimal level. Under adverse selection, L-agents
aggregate positive intertemporal wedge is
IW a:s:L = E(L;1) (1 + x)E(L;1) [u
0 (ca:s:1L (x))]  u0 (ca:s:0L ) (3.33)
= 
H
(1    H)
( (H ; 1)   (L; 1))
E(L;1) (1 + x) [u0 (ca:s:1L (x))  u0 (ca:s:1L (x))] :
Since ca:s:1L (x) > c
a:s:
1L (x) ; wedge IW
a:s:
L is positive.
3.5 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Let us nally introduce both assume moral hazard and adverse selection. This entails that the
distribution of  is common knowledge, although both i and ei are private information.
Again, we assume that the Social Planner nds optimal to induce both continua of individuals
to exert high e¤ort, i.e. ei = 1; i = H;L: is optimal decision on how much to invest (i.e., ki1 level)
is agent-specic and reveals is type. Since decision on ki1 occurs before exerting e¤ort, adverse
selection occurs before moral hazard. Hence, the Social Planner is aware that i-agent may choose
both to mimic j agent, where i 6= j , and exert high e¤ort, i.e., ei = 1, or to mimic j-agent and
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to exert low e¤ort, i.e., ei = 0: Therefore, from Social Planners point of view, low-types incentive
compatibility constraints are
u (c0L)  v (1) + E(L;1) [u (c1L (x))]  max

AL : u (c0H)  v (1) + E(L;1) [u (c1H (x))] ;
BL : u (c0H)  v (0) + E(L;0) [u (c1H (x))] ;
(3.34)
and
E(L;1) [u (c1L (x))]  v (1)  E(L;0) [u (c1L (x))]  v (0) : (3.35)
Similarly, high-skilled agentsincentive compatibility constraints are
u (c0H)  v (1) + E(H ;1) [u (c1H (x))]  max

AH : u (c0L)  v (1) + E(H;1) [u (c1L (x))] ;
BH : u (c0L)  v (0) + E(H ;0) [u (c1L (x))] ;
(3.36)
and
E(H ;1) [u (c1H (x))]  v (1)  E(H;0) [u (c1H (x))]  v (0) : (3.37)
Hereafter, we will refer to (3:34) and (3:36) as the low-skilleds and high skilleds adverse selection
constraints, respectively. Accordingly, (3:35) and (3:37) constraints are dened as the low-skilleds
and high-skilleds moral hazard constraints, respectively.
Let us focus now on constraint (3:34). Low-skilled agents strictly prefer AL (i.e., to mimic
high-skilled agents and to exert high e¤ort), rather than BL (i.e. to mimic high-skilled agents and
to exert zero e¤ort) if and only if
E(L;1) [u (c1H (x))]  E(L;0) [u (c1H (x))] > v (1)  v (0) ;
or equivalently,
 [u (c1H (x))  u (c1H (x))] > v (1)  v (0)
 (L)
: (3.38)
Rearranging (3:37), we immediately derive that, in order to stimulate high-skilled agents to exert
high e¤ort,
 [u (c1H (x))  u (c1H (x))]  v (1)  v (0)
 (H)
: (3.39)
Inequality (3:12) entails that the RHS of (3:38) is strictly higher than the RHS of (3:39) :
Therefore, if low-skilled agents strictly prefer AL to BL, the moral hazard constraint of high-skilled
citizens, i.e., (3:39), is slack at the constrained optimum.
Notice that we assumed that the Social Planner nds it optimal to induce both types of citizens
to exert high e¤ort. This implies that the policy maker must o¤er an optimal allocation that
induces agents to reveal their own type and, at the same time, discourage mimicking. This latter
e¤ect is ensured both types of agents strictly prefer to exert high e¤ort, i.e., when both inequalities
AL > BL and AH > BH hold. In order to make low-skilled better o¤ when choosing AL, instead
of BL, our Social Planner must o¤er an expected gain from e¤ort, equal to
f (L) [u (c1H (x))  u (c1H (x))]g ;
that is higher than the additional disutility due to exerting high e¤ort (i.e., v (1)  v (0)): Since we
assumed  (L) <  (H) ; we can show that
f (L) [u (c1H (x))  u (c1H (x))]g < f (H) [u (c1H (x))  u (c1H (x))]g :
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This means that, given AL > BL, (3:39) is strictly satised at the optimal allocation. Namely,
high-skilled agents strictly prefer high e¤ort.
Moreover, from the RHS of (3:36), H-citizens strictly prefer AH (i.e., to mimic low-skilled agents
and to exert high e¤ort), rather than BH (i.e. to mimic low-skilled agents and to exert zero e¤ort)
i¤
E(H;1) [u (c1L (x))]  E(H ;0) [u (c1L (x))] > v (1)  v (0) ;
or
 [u (c1L (x))  u (c1L (x))] > v (1)  v (0)
 (H)
: (3.40)
Rearranging (3:35) and following the same reasoning, we can show that low-skilled agents weakly
prefer high e¤ort if
 [u (c1L (x))  u (c1L (x))]  v (1)  v (0)
 (L)
: (3.41)
Given  (L) <  (H), the RHS of (3:40) is strictly lower than the RHS of (3:41). Since we
assumed that the Social Planner aims to induce L-workers to exert high e¤ort, constraint (3:41)
implies (3:40) : In other terms, H-workers strictly prefer AH to BH :
Given these results, the relevant constraints for the Social Planner are:
1. the time t = 0 and t = 1 budget constraints, and
2. the inequalities (3:38), (3:41) ; and, now,
u (c0L)  u (c0H)  E(L;1) [u (c1H (x))]  E(L;1) [u (c1L (x))] ; (3.42)
u (c0L)  u (c0H)  E(H ;1) [u (c1H (x))]  E(H;1) [u (c1L (x))] : (3.43)
Constraints (3:42) and (3:43) are low-types and high-types adverse selection constraints, given
that AL > BL and AH > BH ; respectively: Collecting these two constraints, we obtain
 [u (c1H (x))  u (c1H (x))]   [u (c1L (x))  u (c1L (x))] : (3.44)
From (3:38) ; we know that the LHS of (3:44), i.e.,  [u (c1H (x))  u (c1H (x))] has to be strictly
higher than v(1) v(0)(L) : Moreover, being (3:41) constraint binding at the constrained optimum (in
order to minimize high-type informational rent), the RHS of (3:44) coincides with v(1) v(0)(L) : There-
fore, at the optimum, (3:44) is strictly satised. Hence, if both low-skilleds adverse selection and
moral hazard constraints, (3:42) and (3:41), respectively, are binding at the optimum, both high
skilleds constraints, (3:43) and (3:39), respectively, are slack2 .
Therefore, under both adverse selection and moral hazard, the Social Planners problem is as
follows:
max
ei2f0;1g; k1i2[0;k0]; c0i;c1i(x)0; i=H;L



u (c0H) + E(H ;eH)u (c1H)  v (eH)

+(1  ) u (c0L) + E(L;eL)u (c1L)  v (eL) : (3.45)
2An other solution may be derived, when both low-types moral hazard constraint and high-types adverse selection
constraint are binding. In this case, both low-type adverse selection constraint and high-type incentive compatibility
constraint are strictly satised at the optimal solution. We leave this analisys to future research.
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subject to
c0H + k1H  k0;
c0L + k1L  k0,
() E(H ;eH) [c1H (x)] + (1  )E(L;eL) [c1L (x)]
 k1HE(H;eH) [1 + x] + (1  ) k1LE(L;eL) [1 + x] ;
(L) u (c0L)  u (c0H)  E(L;1) [u (c1H (x))]  E(L;1) [u (c1L (x))] ;
(L)  [u (c1L (x))  u (c1L (x))] 
v (1)  v (0)
 (L)
;
where L and L are the Lagrangian multipliers of low-skilled agents adverse selection and moral
hazard constraints, respectively.
The solution of problem 3.5 allows us to write the following:
Proposition 3.5.1 At the constrained optimal allocation, when eL = e

H = 1, all the Lagrangian
multipliers are strictly positive, i.e.,  > 0; L > 0 and L > 0: Both the neglected high-skilleds
incentive compatibility constraints, i.e., (3:43) and (3:39), are slack at the optimum. Furthermore,
kmh:as1H > k
mh:as
1L (3.46)
and  
kmh:as1H   kmh:as1L

>
 
km:h:1H   km:h:1L

> (ka:s:1H   ka:s1L ) ; (3.47)
u0
 
cmh:as1H (x)

u0
 
cmh:as1H (x)
 =
h
1  L (L;1)(H;1)
i
h
1  L (1 (L;1))(1 (H;1))
i > 1; (3.48)
u0
 
cmh:as0H

E(H;1)
"
1
u0
 
cmh:as1H (x)
# = E(H ;1) (1 + x) ; (3.49)
u0 (c1L (x))
u0 (c1L (x))
=
h
1 + L(1 ) +
L
(1 )
(L)
(L;1)
i
h
1 + L(1 )   L(1 ) (L)(1 (L;1))
i > 1; (3.50)
u0
 
cmh:as0L

E(L;1)
"
1
u0
 
cmh:as1L (x)
# = E(L;1) (1 + x) : (3.51)
Proposition deserves some comments. First of all, we can say that inequalities (3:47) are due
to the existence of the low-skilleds adverse selection constraint: by increasing
 
kmh:as1H   kmh:as1L

,
the Social Planner increases the LHS of (3:42) constraint and, therefore, relaxes it. Even if, at the
optimum, high-skilleds moral hazard constraint is strictly satised, inequality (3:48) shows partial
insurance for H-type. This is driven from L-type agentsadverse selection constraint: in order to
induce low-skilled agents to choose to exert high e¤ort, when mimicking high-skilled citizens, it is
necessary that

E(L;1) [u (c1H (x))]  E(L;0) [u (c1H (x))]
	
di¤erence is strictly positive (actu-
ally, bigger than fv (1)  v (0)g > 0 di¤erence), as shown by inequality (3:38). If high-skilled agents
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are fully insured,

E(L;1) [u (c1H (x))]  E(L;0) [u (c1H (x))]
	
= 0: Therefore, the Social Planner
nds optimal to insure H-agents only partially.
A direct consequence of H-types partial insurance is, like the pure moral-hazard case, the
result in (3:49) ; by Jensens inequality, it can be shown that there exists a positive wedge in the
intertemporal Euler equation, in order to limit k1H savings in t = 0. For the same argument, we
have (3:51) :
Inequality (3:50) entails that low-skilled agents are partially insured. This is due to the fact
that the Social Planner aims at inducing them to exert high e¤ort at the optimum.
Using (3:49), we can calculate the H-type aggregate intertemporal wedge:
IWmh:asH = E(H ;1) (1 + x)E(H;1)

u0
 
cmh:as1H (x)
  u0  cmh:as0H  (3.52)
= 
L
  L
E(L;1) (1 + x) ( (H ; 1)   (L; 1))

u0
 
cmh:as1H (x)
  u0  cmh:as1H (x)
> 0: (3.53)
Inequality (3:52) shows that the H-aggregate intertemporal wedge is a consequence of low-skilleds
adverse selection constraint. If it was slack at optimum, i.e., L = 0, no intertemporal wedge
should be imposed. By IWmh;asH > 0, the Social Planner limits high-skilleds savings.(even if, as
shown by inequality (3:47) ; the spread between two typesoptimal saving is higher, than in previous
scenarios); hence inducing them to exert high e¤ort and, therefore, making low-skilled agents better
o¤ when exerting positive e¤ort, than when exerting zero e¤ort (both if mimicking H-agents, or
revealing their low-type).
Finally, from (3:51), L-aggregate intertemporal wedge is
IWmh:asL = E(L;1) (1 + x)E(L;1)

u0
 
cmh:as1L (x)
  u0  cmh:as0L  (3.54)
=

1  + L
E(L;1) (1 + x)L (L)

u0
 
cmh:as1L (x)
  u0  cmh:as1L (x)
> 0:
3.6 Conclusions
In this Chapter we analyzed optimal taxation on entrepreneurs. Under dynamic moral hazard, it
is socially optimal that high-skilled agents invest more, than lowskilled ones, since these formers
expected return of investment is higher. Therefore, it is possible to maximize transfer across agents
in time t = 1: Both H- and L-agents are partially insured, since partial insurance incentives citizens
to exert high e¤ort. Moreover, both types of workers face a positive aggregate intertemporal wedge
between their intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and their discounted expected aggregate
intertemporal rate of transformation.
Conversely, if e¤ort is public information, while skill is private information, adverse selection
is Social Planners issue. Under this scenario, high-skilled workers can pretend to be low-skilled
ones. Therefore, in order to induce these former to reveal their own type, time t = 0 optimal
H-types consumption must increase, while L-types one decreases. However, high-typeoptimal
investment is higher, than low-types one. Since e¤ort is public information and low-skilled agents
incentive compatibility constraint is strictly satised at the optimal allocation, high-productive
citizens are fully insured and H-aggregate intertemporal wedge is zero. Conversely, to minimize
H-types informational rent (i.e., to relax H-types incentive compatibility constraint), low-type
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agents are overinsured. Hence, the Social Planner must harshly tax L-agentsinvestment return,
when x occurs, and subsidizes low-consumption ca:s:1L ; when x occurs. Furthermore, in order to
limit low-skilleds savings, L-aggregate intertemporal wedge is positive.
Finally, we analyzed a model, where both e¤ort and skill are private information. Therefore,
both dynamic moral hazard and adverse selection are relevant issue. Moreover, we are in a scenario,
such that adverse selection occurs before moral hazard. Hence, the Social Planner knows that
i agent can both mimic j agent, i 6= j and exert high e¤ort, or mimic j agent and exert low
e¤ort. At a constrained equilibrium, both L-agentsmoral hazard and adverse selection constraints
are binding, while H-agentsconstraints are slack. However, both agents are partially insured and
both H-aggregate intertemporal wedges are strictly positive. Moreover, due to low-skilleds adverse
selection constraint, with respect to previous scenarios, the spread between type-dependent optimal
investment, i.e.,
 
kmh:as1H   kmh:as1L

, is higher.
Various additional analysis are worthy to be studied in deep. Firstly, we should analyze at which
conditions, under adverse selection, forcing only high-skilled workers to exert positive e¤ort may be
a more favorable equilibrium. Secondly, we must investigate the presence of other interesting sepa-
rating equilibria under both moral hazard and adverse selection. Finally, after having characterized
entrepreneurs intertemporal wedge, we should apply the model to di¤erent market structures.
3.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3:3:1
At eH = e

L = 1, the rst order conditions for Social Planners problem (3:3) are:
@L
@k1H
: u0 (k0   k1H) = E(H;1) [1 + x] ; (3.55)
@L
@k1L
: u0 (k0   k1L) = E(L;1) [1 + x] ; (3.56)
@L
@c1H(x)
: u0 (c1H (x))

1 +
H (H)
 (H;1)

= ; (3.57)
@L
@c1H(x)
: u0 (c1H (x))

1  H (H)
 (1   (H;1))

= ; (3.58)
@L
@c1L(x)
: u0 (c1L (x))

1 +
L (L)
(1  ) (L;1)

= ; (3.59)
@L
@c1L(x)
: u0 (c1L (x))

1  L (L)
(1  ) (1   (L;1))

= : (3.60)
Rearranging these conditions gives the conditions (3:7) to 3.13 of Proposition 3:3:1:
Proof of Proposition 3:4:1
At eH = e

L = 1; the rst order condition for Social Planners problem (3:4) are:
@L
@k1H
: u0 (k0   k1H)

1 +
H


= E(H;1) [1 + x] ; (3.61)
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@L
@k1L
: u0 (k0   k1L)

1  H
1  

= E(L;1) [1 + x] ; (3.62)
@L
@c1H(x)
: u0 (c1H (x))
h
1 +
H

i
= ; (3.63)
@L
@c1H(x)
: u0 (c1H (x))
h
1 +
H

i
= ; (3.64)
@L
@c1L(x)
: u0 (c1L (x))

1  H
(1  )
 (H ; 1)
 (L;1)

= ; (3.65)
@L
@c1L(x)
: u0 (c1L (x))

1  H
(1  )
(1   (H ; 1))
(1   (L;1))

= ; (3.66)
where (H ;1)(L;1) > 1 >
(1 (H ;1))
(1 (L;1)) : Rearranging gives the results of Proposition (3:4:1) :
Proof of Proposition 3:5:1
At eH = e

L = 1; the rst order condition for Social Planners problem (3:5) are:
@L
@k1H
: u0 (k0   k1H)

1  L


= E(H;1) [1 + x] ; (3.67)
@L
@k1L
: u0 (k0   k1L)

1 +
L
1  

= E(L;1) [1 + x] ; (3.68)
@L
@c1H(x)
: u0 (c1H (x))

1  L

 (L; 1)
 (H;1)

= ; (3.69)
@L
@c1H(x)
: u0 (c1H (x))

1  L

(1   (L; 1))
(1   (H;1))

= ; (3.70)
@L
@c1L(x)
: u0 (c1L (x))

1 +
L
(1  ) +
L
(1  )
 (L)
 (L;1)

= ; (3.71)
@L
@c1L(x)
: u0 (c1L (x))

1 +
L
(1  )  
L
(1  )
 (L)
(1   (L;1))

= ; (3.72)
where (H ;1)(L;1) > 1 >
(1 (H ;1))
(1 (L;1)) : Rearranging gives the results of Proposition (3:5:1) :
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